A New Analysis of Innocence as a Constitutional Claim by Kaneb, Paige
Masthead Logo
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2014
A New Analysis of Innocence as a Constitutional
Claim
Paige Kaneb
Northern California Innocence Project
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
50 Cal. W. L. Rev. 4 (2014).
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 50 SPRING 2014 NUMBER 2
Innocence Presum ed: A  N ew  Analysis of Innocence 
as a Constitutional Claim
P a ige  Ka n e b *
A bstra ct
The Supreme Court has never resolved whether innocence is a 
freestanding constitutional claim. Some have mistakenly contended 
that the Court held in 1993 that innocence is not a federal 
constitutional claim. As a result, much of the literature has failed to 
recognize that the door for such claims remains open or that relevant 
circumstances have changed and thus the constitutional analysis has 
changed as well.
In the past two decades, a consensus has emerged among states 
recognizing the right to judicial review o f compelling claims of 
innocence. In the wake o f DNA exonerations, the states reacted 
uniformly in providing petitioners with mechanisms to develop and 
present compelling innocence claims. Modern consensus, widely 
shared practice, and the doctrine o f fundamental fairness now
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demonstrate that innocence claims fall squarely within the protections 
o f the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The states have recognized the need to change their approach to 
innocence claims, but federal courts have not yet done so. In light o f 
vast discrepancies in burdens o f proof and procedural restrictions 
imposed by states, federal courts should establish a constitutional 
floor to ensure that no innocents fall through the gaps left open by 
state laws. The burden for proving innocence must be informed by the 
understanding upon which our criminal justice system is built: 
innocence can rarely be proven and thus must be presumed absent 
proof o f guilt. When new evidence eviscerates the proof o f guilt, 
innocence must be presumed anew.
This article makes four principal contributions. First, it proposes 
a new analysis o f innocence as a freestanding constitutional claim 
that has not been advanced elsewhere. Second, it corrects 
misconceptions regarding the Court’s holding in Herrera. Third, it 
catalogues the state laws and decisions that demonstrate the modern 
consensus among states that compelling claims o f innocence require 
judicial review. Finally, it proposes a workable system o f federal 
judicial review o f innocence claims supported by model state and 
federal legislation.
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In tro d u ctio n
Can a woman who was convicted following a fair trial in state 
court, but who has found new evidence of her innocence, seek federal 
review of that evidence? Imagine a woman sitting in prison, 
convicted of a crime she did not commit. She was arrested months 
after the crime when she had no verifiable alibi. She received a 
procedurally fair trial, but at the time, she simply did not have 
evidence to prove her innocence, nor could she prove the evidence of 
guilt was false.
Ten years later, an investigator finds new facts demonstrating the 
sole evidence of guilt was completely unreliable. The state courts 
agree that no reasonable jury who heard all of the evidence, old and 
new, would convict. However, the state’s post-conviction innocence 
laws only provide for relief when there is affirmative evidence of 
innocence or when DNA evidence points to a different person.1 Thus, 
the state courts affirm her conviction and life sentence even though 
she has proven that she is “not guilty.” She cannot seek review of her 
innocence claim in federal court. Or can she?
Herrera v. Collins, the only case in which the Supreme Court has 
analyzed whether innocence is a freestanding constitutional claim, is 
often misinterpreted.2 The Herrera Court assumed for the sake of
1. For example, the current standard for proving actual innocence in California 
requires a petitioner to “completely undermine” the prosecution’s case and “point 
unerringly to innocence” with evidence that no “reasonable jury could have 
rejected.” In re Lawley, 42 Cal. 4th 1231, 1239 (2008) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Most convictions do not involve biological evidence; 
thus there is no DNA evidence that can point to another person as the perpetrator. 
See infra note 9. Absent DNA, it is nearly impossible to meet this standard, no 
matter how innocent one is—even when there is not a shred of evidence of guilt that 
remains in light of the new evidence. Moreover, many states only permit motions 
for new trials on the grounds of actual innocence when there is DNA evidence that 
supports the claim. See infra note 140.
2. Flerrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). In Herrera, a majority of 
Justices assumed for the sake of deciding the case that a “truly persuasive” claim of 
actual innocence would trigger constitutional protections; however, the majority also 
agreed that petitioner Leonel Herrera’s newly discovered evidence of innocence— 
evidence that his then-deceased brother had shot and killed the two police officers 
Herrera had been convicted of killing—was unpersuasive. Id. at 417-19. Thus,
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deciding the case that a “truly persuasive” claim of innocence would 
warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to 
present the claim.* 3 Despite widespread assertions to the contrary, the 
question of whether innocence is a freestanding constitutional claim 
remains open today.4
The Court’s discussion in Herrera, along with its due process 
jurisprudence, demonstrates the importance of widely shared practice 
in determining what fundamental fairness requires. In 1993, when the 
Court decided Herrera, only nine states reviewed innocence claims 
raised at any time after conviction, while thirty-five states required 
that such claims be raised within sixty days to three years of 
conviction.5 This is no longer the state of the law.6
When faced with DNA exonerations and the undeniable evidence 
that innocent people are wrongfully convicted, the states uniformly
without resolving whether a persuasive showing of innocence would entitle an 
inmate to federal habeas relief, the Court held that Herrera was not entitled to relief. 
Id. However, the case is often misinterpreted and cited for the erroneous proposition 
that the federal courts cannot review compelling claims of innocence or that the
Constitution permits the execution of someone who is actually innocent. See infra 
notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
3. Id. at 417 (“We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, 
that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made 
after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant 
federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.”).
4. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013); House v. Bell, 547 
U.S. 518, 554 (2006). Last year, in McQuiggin, the Supreme Court noted that it has 
“not resolved whether a prisoner may be entitled to [federal] habeas relief based on a 
freestanding claim of actual innocence.” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1931. Similarly, 
in House, the Court reiterated that in Herrera, “the Court assumed without deciding 
that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence made after 
trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal 
habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.” House, 
547 U.S. at 554 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The House Court also “decline[d] to resolve” the question because House 
had barely met the standard for a gateway claim of actual innocence (a showing of 
innocence sufficient to excuse procedural defaults and allow the federal courts to 
consider otherwise barred constitutional claims on their merits), and the Court had 
previously decided the standard for a gateway innocence claim was lower than the 
theoretical showing that would be required to trigger the freestanding claim the 
Court assumed, arguendo, existed. Id. at 555.
5. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 410-11.
6. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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recognized the need to change their approach to post-conviction 
claims of innocence.7 Currently, forty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia provide judicial review of innocence claims without 
conviction-related time limits.8 This widely shared practice 
demonstrates that the right to judicial review of compelling claims of 
innocence is fundamental and thus protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is possible that this right 
always existed, but simply lay dormant while the prospect of an 
innocent person in prison was largely theoretical. Further, the modem 
consensus prohibiting the punishment of the innocent that has 
emerged since Herrera also demonstrates that innocence claims fall 
within the purview of the Eighth Amendment.
As shown in this article, federal judicial review of innocence 
claims is necessary. Many states have unduly high burdens for 
proving innocence. For instance, some states require affirmative 
evidence of innocence, while many others require DNA evidence.9 
Only a handful of states have recognized what the Supreme Court has 
in a different context: that the Constitution cannot permit the 
conviction of a person no reasonable trier of fact would convict.10
7. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 140. Yet physical evidence that could be subject to DNA 
testing may not exist in many criminal cases—and that evidence may have been lost 
or destroyed before it could be subjected to DNA testing. Department o f Justice 
Oversight: Funding Forensic Sciences—DNA and Beyond: Hearing Before the S. 
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the Court o f the S. Comm, on the Judiciary, 108th 
Cong. 23 (2003) [hereinafter Department o f Justice Oversight] (statement of 
Michael M. Baden, M.D., Director, Medicolegal Investigations Unit, New York 
State Police) (“But in my examination of the literature and DOJ statistics, less than 1 
percent of all murders in this country involve sexual assault. They get a lot of 
publicity in the papers, but are small in number, fortunately. In my calculations, in 
less than 10 percent of murders does the perpetrator leave DNA evidence behind. 
Most murders are by gunshots from a distance. About 5 percent of crime labs’ 
workload involves DNA analysis.”).
10. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979) (“The Constitution prohibits 
the criminal conviction of any person except upon proof of guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970). In Jackson, the 
Supreme Court explained that, when an inmate claims there was insufficient 
evidence for a conviction, federal courts must review state convictions by viewing 
the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution” and determining 
whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
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Part I discusses the importance of federal review to state prisoners 
claiming innocence, along with existing statutory limits on federal 
review. It reviews the Supreme Court’s seminal case on innocence, 
Herrera v. Collins, and corrects common misconceptions in legal 
scholarship regarding the Court’s holding. Part I also covers the status 
of freestanding innocence claims post -Herrera and more recent 
Supreme Court guidance on the constitutional stature of innocence.
Part II proposes a new constitutional analysis of innocence claims 
in light of changed circumstances since 1993 when the Supreme Court 
decided Herrera. When faced with concrete evidence that innocent 
people are sometimes wrongfully convicted, the states reacted with 
near-uniformity to provide inmates with mechanisms to obtain judicial 
review of compelling innocence claims without time bars related to 
the conviction date.* 11 This widely shared and near-uniform practice 
demonstrates that the right to present newly discovered evidence of 
innocence, even if it is discovered decades after trial, is fundamental. 
Thus, due process requires that federal courts review compelling 
claims of innocence when there is no state avenue open to process the 
claim.12
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19. Yet the 
Constitution should not permit the continued punishment of a prisoner who has new 
evidence that establishes no reasonable jury could now find proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. After all, why should a conviction following a trial in which the 
jury did not hear all of the evidence be entitled to more weight than a conviction 
following a trial in which the jury did hear all of the evidence relevant to guilt and 
innocence?
11. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
12. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that state and federal procedures 
comport with “fundamental fairness,” and not “offend[] . . .  principle^] of justice 
that [are] deeply rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people.” Cooper v. 
Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 362 (1996) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (discussing U.S. CONST, amend. XIV § 1). The Supreme Court has 
explained that the “near-uniform” recognition of a right or application of a rule can 
demonstrate that a violation thereof “offends a principle of justice that is deeply 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people.” Id. Similarly, the Court has 
noted that “widely shared practice” is one of the “concrete indicators of what 
fundamental fairness and rationality require.” Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 640 
(1991).
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Further, these changed circumstances demonstrate an emergent 
modem consensus prohibiting the punishment of the innocent.13 This 
modem consensus is supported by the recognition that no legitimate 
penological purpose is served by punishing the innocent and that any 
punishment is out of proportion to an innocent person’s lack of 
culpability.14 As such, continued punishment without consideration of 
newly discovered evidence of innocence constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment.
Part III of this article explores what it means to prove innocence 
in a criminal justice system designed to make determinations of guilt. 
The Founders understood that innocence cannot always be proven and 
instead must be presumed absent evidence of guilt.15 State 
mechanisms that require affirmative evidence of innocence or 
exculpatory DNA results have proven too narrow and resulted in the 
clear need for federal courts to establish a constitutional floor to 
protect the rights of the innocent.16 Further, “[t]he meaning of actual 
innocence as formulated by [Supreme Court procedural default 
precedent] does not merely require a showing that a reasonable doubt 
exists in the light of the new evidence, but rather that no reasonable 
juror would have found the defendant guilty.”17 Part III demonstrates
13. Legislation and state practice are ‘“objective indicia of society’s 
standards’” of decency and “national consensus” regarding whether the practice in 
question violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual 
punishment. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010) (quoting Roper v. 
Simmons, 542 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)).
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See, e.g., Roush v. State, 413 So. 2d 15, 23 (Fla. 1982) (“The concept of 
due process, the presumption of innocence, the requirement that only those shown to 
have violated published laws may be subjected to penal sanctions—these are 
principles that the founders of this Republic found so important that they insisted on 
their being written into the basic charter as the Bill of Rights.”).
16. The National Registry of Exonerations demonstrates that less than one 
quarter of all exonerations involve DNA, and that while all had some new evidence 
of innocence, the majority had their convictions overturned on grounds other than 
innocence. N a t ’l R e g ’y  o f EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/ 
exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
17. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995) (discussing Murray v. Carrier, 
477 U.S. 478 (1986), and Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992)). The Schlup 
Court explained that such a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, would 
allow a petitioner to pass through the gateway to have the Court consider his 
procedurally barred yet firmly established constitutional claims. Id. at 316. The
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the reasons a similar, but more restrictive standard is appropriate for 
freestanding innocence claims. Part III also explores the legal 
consequences of a finding of innocence, including questions of 
collateral estoppel, double jeopardy, and potential effects on federal- 
state relations.
Part IV details a workable model for federal judicial review of 
compelling innocence claims. It demonstrates how the burden for 
proving innocence properly balances the “individual interest in 
avoiding injustice [which] is most compelling in the context of actual 
innocence,” with society’s interests in “finality,” “comity,” and 
conservation of “judicial resources.” 18 Further, freestanding claims of 
innocence would fit neatly within existing federal court practices and 
would not be overly burdensome. Finally, Part IV offers model 
federal and state legislation to assist in developing a cohesive, 
effective, and efficient judicial system to identify and release innocent 
prisoners.
This article makes four principal contributions. First, it proposes 
a new analysis of innocence as a freestanding constitutional claim that 
has not been advanced elsewhere. Second, it corrects misconceptions 
regarding the Court’s holding in Herrera. Third, it catalogues the 
state laws and decisions that demonstrate the modem consensus that 
compelling claims of innocence require judicial review. Finally, it 
proposes a workable system of federal judicial review of compelling 
claims of innocence supported by model legislation.
I. State  In n o cen ce  Un d e r  Ex isting  Fed er a l  La w
State prisoners may only seek federal review of habeas corpus 
claims when alleging violations of federal constitutional rights or 
federal laws. 19 Thus, federal courts can only review innocence claims
innocence gateway is necessary because, as the Court had previously concluded, “a 
prisoner retains an overriding ‘interest in obtaining his release from custody if he is 
innocent of the charge for which he was incarcerated.’” Id. at 321 (quoting 
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,452 (1986)).
18. M a t 324.
19. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774 (2008); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), 
(c)(3) (2012) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . .  
[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States . . . . ”); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012) (“The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a 
circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas
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raised by state prisoners if innocence, in and of itself, is a freestanding 
constitutional claim. As discussed further in Part I.C, the Supreme 
Court has “not resolved whether a prisoner may be entitled to [federal] 
habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence.”20 
However, that is not the end of the inquiry. Part II establishes that 
innocence is a freestanding federal constitutional claim. The 
following sections discuss the need for federal review, existing 
impediments to such review, and Supreme Court precedent on this 
issue.
A. The Importance o f Federal Review
Federal judicial review of constitutional claims remains vital to 
state prisoners, including the innocent. Federal courts continue to 
recognize constitutional violations after state courts have denied relief 
on the same bases.21 For instance, there are more than forty 
exonerees22 listed in the National Registry of Exonerations who were 
granted relief by federal courts after state courts had affirmed their 
convictions.23
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 
only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States.”).
20. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013).
21. See sources cited supra note 19.
22. The Registry defines an exoneree as “[a] person who was convicted of a 
crime and later officially declared innocent of that crime, or relieved of all legal 
consequences of the conviction because evidence of innocence that was not 
presented at trial required reconsideration of the case.” Glossary, NATIONAL Nat’l 
Registry Reg’y of Exonerations, available at 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx (last visited 
June 2, 2014).
23. Ricardo Aldape Guerra, Chamar Avery, David Ayers, Gene Curtis 
Ballinger, Derrick Bell, Earl Berryman, David Boyce, Timothy Brown, Kum Yet 
Cheung, Jabbar Collins, Kenneth M. Conley, Cory Credell, Patrick Croy, Ricky 
Cullipher, Joseph D’Ambrosio, Robert Escalera, Charles Fain, Timothy Gantt, Jose 
Garcia, Terence Gamer, Antoine Goff, Thomas Lee Goldstein, Harold Hall, 
Benjamin Harris, Dale Helmig, John Jackson, Lesly Jean, Levon Junior Jones, Paul 
Kamienski, Daniel Larsen, Rafael Madrigal, Benjamin Miller, Darrel Parker, 
Michael Piaskowski, Michael Porter, Thomas Sawyer, Stephen Schulz, George 
Seiber, Michael Smith, Larry Pat Souter, Gordon Steidl, Richard Sturgeon, John 
Tennison, and Eddie Triplett. Archive of Cases, Nat’l Reg’y of Exonerations, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx (last visited Oct.
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These cases demonstrate that federal courts discern constitutional 
violations missed by state courts, even when the violations resulted in 
the wrongful convictions of innocent men and women. For example, 
John Tennison’s conviction was eventually overturned in federal court 
on the basis of evidence withheld by the police and prosecution—but 
only after the California courts first had denied his claims.24 Despite 
the weakness of the case against Tennison, and the overwhelming 
strength of the evidence that had been withheld, Tennison was only 
able to obtain relief in federal court.25 The prosecution subsequently 
dismissed all charges against Tennison.26 Similarly, the other 
exonerees listed above in footnote 23 were forced to rely on 
constitutional violations independent of their innocence claims to 
obtain relief; unfortunately, however, not every innocent person can 
establish such a violation.
Federal courts should review claims of innocence for four reasons. 
First, as shown in Part II, innocence is a freestanding constitutional 
claim.27 Thus, innocence claims are entitled to federal judicial review 
in their own right. Moreover, as detailed in Part IV, there is a 
workable system of review; due process demands that such a system 
be employed to identify constitutional violations.28
Second, state restrictions on innocence claims, from requiring 
affirmative evidence of innocence or DNA evidence to limiting the
2, 2013). In some of these cases, the federal courts found the person actually 
innocent under the Schlup gateway standard in order to hear their constitutional 
claims, but, of course, none were found innocent under Herrera or had actual 
innocence as the basis for reversal. Id.
24. Tennison v. Henry, No. 98-3842 CW, 2003 WL 25851307, at * 1 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 26, 2003). The suppressed evidence included a confession from Ricard, a 
man unrelated to Tennison, the identity of and statement from a witness who had 
identified Ricard as the killer, the existence and disposition of $2500 from the Secret 
Witness Fund request for this case, the recantation and subsequent polygraph of one 
of the two prosecution witnesses, and a videotaped interview of a witness who 
contradicted the version of the facts offered by the two prosecution witnesses. Id. at
*1-29,36-36-46.
25. Id. at *47.
26. Maurice Possley, John Tennison, N a t ’L R e g ’Y OF EXONERATIONS, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3680 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2104.)
27. See infra Part II.
28. See infra Part IV.
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presentation of newly discovered evidence to thirty days after its 
discovery,29 fail to provide adequate process to all those entitled to 
constitutional protections. Federal courts must establish a 
constitutional floor to catch the innocent prisoners who fall through 
the large gaps left open by state laws.
Third, while there may be other mechanisms for reversal when 
new evidence rightly calls into question the fairness of a trial, those 
mechanisms have their own quirks and are not always available to 
every innocent person.30 For instance, consider a declaration from an 
expert recanting his trial testimony. The declaration explains that the 
expert relied on a scientific technique that is no longer valid, and as a 
result, his opinion is no longer reliable. If the expert testimony was 
the only evidence of guilt, the recantation could perhaps support a 
false testimony claim. However, in 2012, the California Supreme 
Court held that:
[0]ne does not establish false evidence merely by presenting 
evidence that an expert witness has recanted the opinion testimony 
given at trial. Likewise, when new expert opinion testimony is 
offered that criticizes or casts doubt on opinion testimony given at 
trial, one has not necessarily established that the opinion at trial was 
fa lse .31
Similarly, the Supreme Court has only recognized that the 
Constitution requires reversal when the prosecution knew or should 
have known that the testimony was false; it has not extended this rule 
to situations in which the prosecution had no reason to know the 
testimony was false.32
Fourth, when other routes to reversal are pursued, the person is 
often left without a finding of innocence and vulnerable to claims that 
he or she was released “on a technicality.”33 Moreover, the lack of
29. See infra note 140.
30. For instance, in California, the standard for habeas relief is much lower for 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and false 
testimony. In re Lawley, 179 P.3d 891, 898-99 (Cal. 2008).
31. In re Richards, 289 P.3d 860, 870-71 (Cal. 2012).
32. Cash v. Maxwell, 132 S. Ct. 611, 615 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959).
33. See, e.g., Man Freed From Prison After 20 Years Behind Bars, KTVU 
(Mar. 28, 2011, 10:15 PM), http://www.ktvu.com/news/news/man-ffeed-from-
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such a finding can affect the wrongfully convicted person’s ability to 
obtain compensation and to have arrest records sealed, along with 
employability, reputation, and other collateral consequences that result 
from convictions for serious crimes, even when those convictions 
have been reversed for constitutional violations and charges are 
subsequently dismissed. 34
Federal courts can provide relief to inmates when they have been 
denied procedural constitutional protections35 designed to protect the 
innocent from wrongful conviction.36 Indeed, the majority stated in
prison-after-20-years-behind-bars/nKWsL/. Of course, constitutional protections are 
not mere technicalities. Further, to obtain relief, generally an inmate must show 
both a constitutional violation and a “reasonable probability” that absent that 
violation, the result would have been “different”-in other words, that he or she 
probably would have been acquitted. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668,694(1984).
34. For example, when Maurice Caldwell was released after spending 20 years
in prison for a crime he did not commit, the prosecutor repeatedly stressed the lack 
of a finding of innocence, even though Caldwell’s conviction was reversed because 
his attorney was ineffective in that he failed to investigate the evidence of 
Caldwell’s innocence. See KTVU, supra note 33; Paige Kaneb, DA Should Admit 
Convicting an Innocent Man, SFGATE (April 12, 2011, 4:00 AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/D-A-should-admit-convicting-an- 
innocent-man-2375255.php. As a result, it has been more difficult for Caldwell to 
obtain compensation, because, although his criminal record shows that his 
conviction was overturned and the charges subsequently dismissed, the record was 
not sealed or the conviction otherwise removed from his record.
35. See sources cited supra note 19.
36. See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016-20 (1988) (“[Confrontation 
[of witnesses] is essential to fairness” because “it is always more difficult to tell a lie 
about a person ‘to his face,’” and “face-to-face presence” may “confound and undo 
the false accuser....”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that in requiring a showing of prejudice for ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, a majority of the Supreme Court had assumed that the “only purpose 
of the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is to reduce the 
chance that innocent persons will be convicted”); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. 
Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (“The function of legal process, as 
that concept is embodied in the Constitution, and in the realm of factfinding, is to 
minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.”); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
709 (1974) (compulsory process meets the “need to develop all relevant facts” 
because “[t]he ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be 
founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts”); In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (reasonable doubt standard “is a prime instrument for 
reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error” and “[i]t is critical that the
184 C a lifornia  W estern  La w  Rev iew [Vol. 50
Herrera that the many constitutional rights afforded to criminal 
defendants “ensur[e] against the risk of convicting of an innocent 
person.”37 Similarly, Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence in 
Herrera, explained that “[o]ur society has a high degree of confidence 
in its criminal trials, in no small part because the Constitution offers 
unparalleled protections against convicting the innocent.”38 However, 
since Herrera, we have learned how often those unparalleled 
protections can fail.39
For the Constitution to provide procedural safeguards to protect 
the innocent from punishment, yet not prohibit the punishment of the 
innocent simply because they had the benefit of a procedurally fair 
trial would be a misguided elevation of form over substance. It 
offends the very notion of due process to deny judicial review of new 
evidence and keep the innocent in prison simply because—even 
though evidence proving innocence had not yet been discovered— 
they received a “fair” trial.
Federal review of compelling claims of innocence is thus both 
needed and required by the Constitution.40 The following section 
discusses current limitations on federal review affecting freestanding 
claims of innocence.
B. Legislative Limitations
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA), federal courts can grant habeas corpus relief to a state 
prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”41 Moreover, 
federal courts may not grant relief for constitutional claims that were
moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves 
people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned”); Powell v. Alabama, 
287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (“Without [the right to counsel], though he be not guilty, he 
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his 
innocence.”).
37. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398-99 (1993).
38. Id. at 420 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
39. The National Registry of Exonerations lists 1,351 exonerees for whom 
those protections have failed, the vast majority of whom were exonerated after the 
Supreme Court decided Herrera. N a t ’l  R e g ’y  OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 16.
40. See infra Part 11.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012).
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denied on the merits by a state court unless the denial was “contrary 
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established” 
federal law or “resulted in a decision that was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 
presented” to the state court.42 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has 
yet to firmly establish innocence as a freestanding constitutional 
claim. Thus, the narrow limitations of AEDPA, coupled with the 
Supreme Court’s failure to hold that innocence is a freestanding 
constitutional claim, preclude lower federal courts from reviewing the 
merits of freestanding claims of innocence.43 The Tenth Circuit 
acknowledged this position in response to one inmate’s evidence of 
innocence: “As much as these recantations give us pause, if Herrera is 
to be revisited, it is not for us to do so.” 44
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(l)-(2) (2012) (“An application for a writ of habeas 
corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in 
State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim. . .  resulted in a 
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” 
or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”).
43. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Yates, No. CIV S-08-2165-JAM-TJB, 2010 WL 
4628197, at *33 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2010) (“to the extent Petitioner asserts a 
freestanding actual innocence claim, he is not entitled to relief because. . .  the 
United States Supreme Court has expressly left open the question of whether a 
freestanding actual innocence claim based on newly discovered evidence constitutes 
grounds for habeas relief in a non-capital case. In the absence of Supreme Court 
authority establishing the cognizability of a freestanding actual innocence claim on 
federal habeas review, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of petitioner’s 
freestanding actual innocence claim could not be contrary to, or involve an 
unreasonable application of, ‘clearly established’ Supreme Court authority.” 
(quoting Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006); Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 
955 (9th Cir. 2004))); see also Wright v. Stegall, 247 F. App’x. 709, 711 (6th Cir. 
2007) (“Since the Supreme Court has declined to recognize a freestanding innocence 
claim in habeas corpus, outside the death-penalty context, this court finds that 
petitioner’s claim is not entitled to relief under available Supreme Court 
precedent.”).
44. Allen v. Beck, 179 F. App’x. 548, 551 (10th Cir. 2006).
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C. The Seminal Case: Herrera v. Collins
The U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Herrera was very narrow: 
Herrera’s showing of innocence was insufficient to entitle him to 
federal habeas relief.45 To reach that conclusion, a majority of the 
Justices assumed, “for the sake of argument,” that “a truly persuasive 
demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the 
execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas 
relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.”46 
However, because Herrera’s “showing of innocence” fell “far short of 
that which would have to be made in order to trigger the sort of 
constitutional claim which we have assumed, arguendo, to exist,” the 
Court, without reaching the question of whether innocence is a valid 
constitutional claim, held that Herrera was not entitled to relief.47 
Notably, in both 2006 and 2013, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that it 
did not resolve whether innocence is a freestanding constitutional 
claim in Herrera and has not resolved the question in subsequent
48cases.
1. The Facts: Far from Ideal for Innocence
Leonel Herrera was convicted of killing a police officer in 1981 
and sentenced to death in 1982; afterward, he pled guilty to the 
murder of another police officer.49 The evidence of Herrera’s guilt 
was strong: police discovered Herrera’s Social Security card near the 
body of Officer David Rucker, who was “found lying beside his patrol 
car,” shot in the head.50 Shortly later, “Officer Enrique Carrisalez
45. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 418-19.
48. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554-55 (2006) (“[T]he Court [in Herrera] 
assumed without deciding that, ‘in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of 
“actual innocence” made after trial would render the execution of a defendant 
unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open 
to process such a claim.’” (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417)); McQuiggin v. 
Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013) (affirming that the Supreme Court has “not 
resolved whether a prisoner may be entitled to [federal] habeas relief based on a 
freestanding claim of actual innocence.”).
49. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 394.
50. Id. at 422 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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stopped a car speeding away from the murder scene” and was shot in 
the chest by the driver.51 Before he was shot, however, Officer 
Carrisalez radioed in the car’s license plate, which revealed the car 
was registered to Herrera’s girlfriend. 52 Moreover, Officer Carrisalez 
“lived long enough to identify” Herrera as the shooter. 53
Police also found blood “spattered” across the exterior and 
interior of Herrera’s girlfriend’s car, inside Herrera’s wallet, and on 
his jeans; the blood was the same enzyme profile and type as Officer 
Rucker’s and different than Herrera’s. 54 Further, Herrera had a letter 
on him when arrested, which “strongly implied that he had killed 
Rucker.” 55 Indeed, “[w]hen the police attempted to interrogate 
[Herrera] about the killings, he told them ‘it was all in the letter’ and 
suggested that, if ‘they wanted to know what happened’ they should 
read it.” 56
Years after his conviction, Herrera presented evidence that his by- 
then-deceased brother was the actual killer. 57 Herrera filed 
declarations from three people to whom his brother had confessed
51. Id.
52. Id. Herrera had a set of keys to the car on his person when he was arrested 
several days later. Id.
53. Id. A second witness, Enrique Hernandez, “also identified [Herrera] as the 
culprit.” Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 394-395 (majority opinion). The confession letter read, in part:
“To whom it may concern: I am terribly sorry for those I have brought
grief to their lives. Who knows why? We cannot change the future’s 
problems with problems from the past. What I did was for a cause and 
purpose. One law runs others, and in the world we live in, that’s the way 
it is.
What happened to [Officer] Rucker was for a certain reason. I knew him 
as Mike Tatum. He was in my business, and he violated some of its laws 
and suffered the penalty, like the one you have for me when the time 
comes.
. . .  The other officer that became part of our lives, me and Rucker’s 
(Tatum), that night had not to do in this [sic]. He was out to do what he 
had to do, protect, but that’s life.
Id. at 395 n.l (second alteration in original).
56. Id. at 423 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Herrera v. State, 682 
S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
57. Id. at 396-97 (majority opinion).
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either shortly after the crime or in the years before he died, including 
his brother’s former attorney.58 Additionally, Herrera filed a 
declaration from his brother’s son, who was nine at the time of the 
murders, who swore that he was in the car and saw his father shoot 
Officers Rucker and Carrisalez.59 Based on this evidence, Herrera 
argued that, because he was innocent, his pending “execution would 
thus violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”60
2. Fractured Court Leaves Unresolved the Ultimate Issue
After the Texas state courts denied relief,61 the federal district 
court granted a stay of execution,62 which the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit promptly vacated based upon its understanding that
58. Id. at 396.
59. Id. at 397; see also Leonel Herrera, CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, 
Bluhm Legal Clinic, http://www.law.northwestem.edu/legalclinic/wrongful 
convictions/issues/deathpenalty/wrongfulexecutions/leonel-herrera.html (last visited 
April 21, 2014).
60. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 396-98.
61. Id. at 395-96. Herrera filed his evidence of innocence first in the state 
courts, but was denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. Id. The “State District 
Court. .. [found] that ‘no evidence at trial remotely suggested] that anyone other 
than [petitioner] committed the offense.’” Id. at 396 (second and third alterations in 
original) (quoting Ex parte Herrera, No. 81-CR-672-C, |  35 (Tex. 197th Jud. Dist., 
Jan. 14, 1991)). While this is an odd justification for finding newly discovered 
evidence of innocence insufficient, the evidence of Herrera’s guilt at trial was, as 
discussed above, overwhelming. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the 
lower court’s decision. Id. (citing Ex parte Herrera, 819 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1991)).
62. Id. at 397. The federal district court granted Herrera’s request for a stay of 
execution ‘“in order to ensure that Petitioner can assert his constitutional claims and 
out of a sense of fairness and due process.’” Id. (quoting Herrera v. Texas, No. M- 
92-30, at 38-39 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 1992)).
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evidence of innocence is not a ground for federal habeas relief. 63 The 
United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari.64
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas joined.65 
The majority held that Herrera’s showing of innocence was 
insufficient to meet the hypothetical “extraordinarily high” “threshold 
showing” that would be required to trigger a freestanding claim of 
innocence—a claim the Court only assumed existed for the sake of 
deciding the case. 66 Thus, because Herrera’s showing was inadequate, 
the Court had no reason to reach the constitutional question of 
whether innocence is a freestanding claim for federal habeas relief.
Justice O’Connor authored a concurring opinon, which Justice 
Kennedy joined. 67 Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurrence, which 
Justice Thomas joined.68 Justice White also authored a separate 
concurrence, but did not join the majority’s opinion.69 Justice 
Blackmun, joined in part by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented 
from the Court’s opinion and explained that the Court should have 
held that a persuasive showing of innocence would render a pending 
execution unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 70
While the Court’s holding was narrow and left the ultimate issue 
unresolved, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in lengthy discussion that has 
resulted in much confusion, suggested that innocence is not a 
freestanding constitutional claim. 71 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
63. Id. at 397-97 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029, 1032 (5th Cir. 
1992)). The Fifth Circuit explained that, “[a]bsent an accompanying constitutional 
violation,” Herrera’s freestanding “claim of actual innocence was not cognizable 
because, under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963), ‘the existence merely 
of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground 
for relief on federal habeas corpus.’” Id. (full citation omitted) (quoting Herrera, 
954 F.2d at 1034).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 390.
66. M a t 417.
67. Id. at 420 (O’Connor, J., concurring). See discussion infra Part I.C.4.ii.
68. Id. at 427-28 (Scalia, J., concurring). See discussion infra Part I.C.4.iv.
69. Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring). See discussion infra Part I.C.4.iii.
70. Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See discussion infra Part I.C.4.i.
71. Id. at 400-17 (majority opinion).
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the Supreme Court had never held that innocence is a freestanding 
constitutional claim, because ‘“the existence merely of newly 
discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a 
ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.”’72
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Eighth Amendment 
applies only to sentencing challenges; thus, because Herrera had 
challenged his conviction and not his sentence, the Eighth 
Amendment arguably did not apply to his claim.73 In response 
however, Justice Blackmun pointed out that the “legitimacy of 
punishment is inextricably intertwined with guilt.”74 Thus, “whether 
[Herrera] is viewed as challenging simply his death sentence or also 
his continued detention, he [would] still be challenging the State’s 
right to punish him.”75
Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment and due process, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist analyzed Herrera’s claim under procedural due 
process standards.76 He explained that Herrera was not legally 
innocent, but rather that he “c[a]me before this Court. . .  as one who 
has been convicted by due process of law of two capital murders.”77 
“The question before us, then, is not whether due process prohibits the 
execution of an innocent person, but rather whether it entitles 
petitioner to judicial review of his ‘actual innocence’ claim,” an issue 
“properly analyzed only in terms of procedural due process.”78
Reviewing “contemporary practice in the States” in analyzing 
Herrera’s due process challenge, Chief Justice stated that in 1993, 
when the Court decided Herrera, only fifteen states allowed inmates 
to raise motions for new trials based on newly discovered evidence 
more than three years after conviction.79 Of those fifteen states, only
72. Id. at 400 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 
317 (1963)). Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to state that “[t]his rule is grounded in 
the principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not 
imprisoned in violation of the Constitution—not to correct errors of fact.” Id.
73. M a t 406-07.
74. Id. at 434 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 433-34.
76. Id. at 407 (majority opinion).
77. Id. at 407 n.6.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 411.
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nine allowed inmates to raise those motions with no time limits.80 At 
the time, Texas was one of seventeen states that required such motions 
to be made within sixty days of judgment.81 The time limits in 
eighteen other states ranged from one to three years.82
Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed to these state practices in 
concluding that “we cannot say that Texas’ refusal to entertain 
petitioner’s newly discovered evidence eight years after his conviction 
transgresses a principle of fundamental fairness ‘rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people.’”83 However, this reasoning 
compels a different conclusion today.84
Ultimately, the Court assumed for the sake of argument that “a 
truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence” would “render the 
execution of [Herrera] unconstitutional,” but nonetheless denied 
Herrera’s claim because he had not met the hypothetical burden of 
proof required to trigger such a claim.85
3. Correcting the Misconceptions
Portions of the Court’s discussion in Herrera, read in isolation, 
have led legal scholars86, practitioners87, and courts astray.88
80. Id. at 411 & n. 11.
81. Id. at 410 & n.8.
82. Id. at 410 & n.10.
83. Id. at 411 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)).
84. See discussion infra Part II.
85. Id. at 417 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. See, e.g., Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics o f Death, 
94 Va. L. Rev. 283, 373 (2008) (alleging that the Court in Herrera “rejected the 
view that the Constitution forbids execution of factually innocent defendants who 
were convicted after a fair trial”); James C. Harrington & Anne More Burnham, 
Texas’s New Habeas Corpus Procedure for Death-Row Inmates: Kafkaesque—And 
Probably Unconstitutional, 27 St. Mary’s L.J. 69, 78 (1995) (claiming that in 
“Herrera v. Collins, the Court imposed further restrictions by eliminating federal 
habeas relief for death-row inmates claiming actual innocence.”) (footnote omitted).
87. See, e.g., Jordan v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 485 F.3d 1351, 1353 (11th Cir. 
2007) (petitioner’s appointed counsel, relying on Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400, 
“conceded, on behalf of [his client], that a freestanding claim of actual innocence 
[does] not provide a basis for federal habeas relief’).
88. See, e.g., Rozelle v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 672 F.3d 1000, 1010 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (asserting that the Herrera Court held that “no federal habeas relief is 
available for freestanding, non-capital claims of actual innocence”); Zuem v. Tate,
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Numerous legal scholars have advanced the erroneous claim that the 
Supreme Court held in Herrera that innocence is not a freestanding 
constitutional claim.89 On the contrary, as discussed above, the
336 F.3d 478, 482 n.l (6th Cir. 2003) (citing to Herrera for the proposition that 
“[t]he Supreme Court has held that newly discovered evidence does not constitute a 
freestanding ground for federal habeas relief, but rather that the newly discovered 
evidence can only be reviewed as it relates to an ‘independent constitutional 
violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding’”); Graves v. 
Cockrell, 351 F.3d 143, 151 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Supreme Court held [in 
Herrera] that such a claim does not state an independent, substantive constitutional 
claim and was not a basis for federal habeas relief. However, it left open whether a 
truly persuasive actual innocence claim may establish a constitutional violation 
sufficient to state a claim for habeas relief. The Fifth Circuit has rejected this 
possibility and held that claims of actual innocence are not cognizable on federal 
habeas review.” (citation omitted)); Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir. 
1994), (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400-01, in asserting that since petitioner is not 
sentenced to death, “Supreme Court precedent does not allow a federal court to issue 
a writ of habeas corpus only on the ground that [petitioner] is, or might be, innocent 
o f . . . murder”).
89. See, e.g., David Niven, Unlocking the Eighth Amendment’s Power to Make 
Innocence a Constitutional Claim: The ‘Objective’ Views o f State Legislators, 18 
B a r r y  L. R e v . 213, 224 (2103) (“The Court has ruled [in Herrera] actual innocence 
is not itself a constitutional claim. . . . ”) (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Anna Naimark et al., Troy Davis Execution Exposes 
Inequity Between the Capital Punishment Cases with DNA Evidence and Those 
Without, 19 Hum. R t s . B r ie f  25, 25 (Sept. 2011) (“The majority in Herrera 
ultimately found that ‘a claim of “actual innocence” is not itself a constitutional 
claim’ and may have a ‘very disruptive effect’ on the justice system.”); Trevor M. 
Wilson, Innocent Owners and Actual Innocence: Raising Innocence as a 
Constitutional Defense to Government Punishment, 19 S. CAL. REV. L. &  SOC. JUST. 
377, 398 (2010) (“The Court has similarly reverted to its strict rejection of 
innocence as a defense in the habeas corpus context.”); Sophia S. Chang, Note, 
Protecting the Innocent: Post-Conviction DNA Exoneration, 36 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 285, 303 (2009) (“[I]n Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court decided that 
claims of actual innocence are not constitutional claims.. . .  Habeas corpus cannot 
be used by those who simply proclaim that they are factually innocent.”) (footnote 
omitted); Bernard A. Williams, Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Tragedy of 
Habeas Capital Appeals, 18 J.L. & POL. 773, 795 (2002) (“In a seminal case decided 
in 1993, Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court held that newly discovered evidence 
of actual innocence cannot form the basis of federal habeas review unless the 
evidence is also accompanied by a claim of a constitutional violation.”); Kimberly 
A. Orem, Evolution o f an Eighth Amendment Dichotomy: Substantive and 
Procedural Protections Within the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in Capital 
Cases, 12 C a p . D e f . J. 345, 355 (2000) (“In Herrera v. Collins the Court held that a 
claim of actual innocence is not an independent basis for federal habeas relief.”);
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Herrera Court left open the question of whether innocence is a 
freestanding constitutional claim; indeed, as recently as 2013, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed that it has “not resolved whether a prisoner 
may be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of 
actual innocence.”90
A similarly erroneous claim propagated by some legal scholars is 
that the Supreme Court held in Herrera that the Constitution permits 
the execution of an innocent person.91 Justice O’Connor’s
John F. Erbes & Stephen W. Baker, Survey o f Illinois Law: Criminal Law and 
Procedure, 21 S. III. U. L.J. 759, 772 (1997) (“[T]he Court [in Herrera] had found 
such a claim [of innocence] was not a federal constitutional issue . . . . ”); Ariane M. 
Schreiber, Note, States that Kill: Discretion and the Death Penalty—A Worldwide 
Perspective, 29 CORNELL In t ’l  L.J. 263, 299 (1996) (“In Herrera v. Collins, the 
Supreme Court held that a ‘claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered 
evidence is not ground for habeas relief.’”) (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 390); 
Harrington & Burnham, supra note 86, at 78 (“The Supreme Court held in Herrera 
that a claim of actual innocence does not entitle a death-row inmate to federal relief 
because the trial court is the appropriate forum for determining factual innocence or 
guilt in criminal cases.”); Jennifer Breuer, Habeas Corpus—Limited Review for 
Actual Innocence, 84 J. C r im . L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943, 957 (1994) (“Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision by relying 
on the rule that absent an accompanying constitutional violation, a claim of actual 
innocence is not a ground for federal habeas corpus relief. The Court thus 
reaffirmed the principle that ‘federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are 
not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution—not to correct errors of fact.’”) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400); Emanuel Margolis, Habeas 
Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV. 557, 618 (“[I]n Herrera v. 
Collins, the Court declared that the claim of ‘actual innocence’ is ‘not itself a 
constitutional claim .. . . ’”) (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404).
90. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013).
91. Kathleen Callahan, Note, In Limbo: In Re Davis and the Future o/Herrera 
Innocence Claims in Federal Habeas Proceedings, 53 ARIZ. L. Rev. 629, 633 
(2011) (“[I]n the 1993 case Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court held that 
punishing a person who can establish innocence does not violate the Constitution.”); 
Nicholas Berg, Note, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy o f  Herrera v. 
Collins, 42 Am . Crim. L. Rev. 121, 121 (2005) (“[T]he Herrera Court found that 
executing such a prisoner who can show he is probably innocent is constitutional.”); 
Michael Mello, “In the Years When Murder Wore the Mask o f Law ”: Diary o f a 
Capital Appeals Lawyer (1983-1986), 24 VT. L. Rev. 583, 601 n.75 (2000) (“The 
Court held [in Herrera] that executing an innocent person does not violate the 
Constitution. Electrocuting or hanging or gassing or shooting a totally innocent man 
does not violate the Constitution’s guarantees of ‘due process of law’ and ‘equal 
protection’ of the law. Hanging or injecting or gassing a totally innocent women 
[sic] does not constitute ‘cruel and unusual punishment.’”); Stuart G. Friedman,
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concurrence in Herrera addressed this exact misconception and 
clarified that, “[njowhere does the Court state that the Constitution 
permits the execution of an actually innocent person.”92
4. Herrera Claims: Counting the “Votes” for Innocence
Since Herrera, lawyers and inmates have raised or attempted to 
raise freestanding innocence claims—often referred to as Herrera 
claims—in federal courts.93 It is typically argued in favor of these 
claims that while a majority of the Court in Herrera assumed for the 
sake of deciding the case that innocence was a constitutional claim, a 
different majority would have held that the execution of an innocent 
person violates the Constitution.94 Support for Herrera claims raised 
with this argument is found in Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion 
(joined in part by Justices Stevens and Souter), along with the 
concurring opinions of Justice O’Connor (joined by Justice Kennedy)
Hurdling the 6.500 Barrier: A Guide to Michigan Post-Conviction Remedies, 14
T. M. COOLEY L. R e v . 65, 86 n.122 (1997) (“[In] Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 
(1993),... the U.S. Supreme Court found that the federal [C]onstitution does not 
prohibit executing an actually innocent person as long as that person received a fair 
trial.”); Kelli Hinson, Comment, Post-Conviction Determination o f Innocence for 
Death Row Inmates, 48 SMU L. Re v . 231, 233 (1994) (“The Supreme Court has 
previously rejected this argument [that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
prohibit the execution of an innocent person] and held in Herrera v. Collins .. . that 
the criminal justice procedures already in place adequately protect an accused’s 
constitutional rights.”).
92. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 427 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
93. See, e.g., Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 477-78 (9th Cir. 1997).
94. See, e.g., id. at 476 (“[A] majority of the Supreme Court [in Herrera] 
assumed, without deciding, that execution of an innocent person would violate the 
Constitution. A different majority would have explicitly so held.” (comparing 
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417, with id. at 419 (O’Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J., 
concurring), and id. at 430-37 (Blackmun, J., joined in part by Stevens & Souter, JJ., 
dissenting))); In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 760 (Cal. 1993) (“A majority of the 
[J]ustices of the United States Supreme Court have expressed a belief [in Herrera] 
that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments preclude execution of an innocent 
person. Their statements imply that in a capital case a claim of actual innocence of 
the crime of which the petitioner stands convicted must be considered regardless of 
when it is raised or if constitutional error affected the verdict.” (citing Herrera, 506
U. S. at 419-27, 429-46 (O’Connor, J., concurring; White, J., concurring; Blackmun, 
J., dissenting))).
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and Justice White. 95 Both the Ninth Circuit and the California 
Supreme Court96 have endorsed this view, as have a number of legal 
scholars.97 However, the following questions accompany innocence 
claims based on this argument.
i. The Dissent: Incarceration and Execution
The Herrera dissent makes clear that Justices Blackmun, Stevens, 
and Souter would have held that the Constitution prohibits the 
execution of someone who is innocent. 98 The dissenting Justices 
asserted that both the Eighth Amendment and the substantive Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit the execution
95. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419-29 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 429-430 
(White, J., concurring); id. at 430-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
96. See cases cited supra note 94.
97. See, e.g., Judith M . Barger, Innocence Found: Retribution, Capital 
Punishment, and the Eighth Amendment, 46 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (“[S]ix 
[J]ustices at least hypothetically agreed that such claims could be presented by 
individuals who had been sentenced to death. . . . ”) (footnote omitted) (citing 
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 397-98, 417; id. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 435 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)); James G. Clessuras, Note, Schlup v. Delo: Actual 
Innocence as Mere Gatekeeper, 86 J. C r im . L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1305, 1309 (1996) 
(“Although Chief Justice Rehnquist would not express an opinion as to whether 
there is a constitutional prohibition against the execution of a person who has made 
a persuasive showing of actual innocence (discussing the purported prohibition only 
arguendo), six [J]ustices—three dissenting and three concurring—concluded that 
such a prohibition exists.”); Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. 
Rev. 1629, 1700 (2008) (“Six Justices in Herrera agreed that the Fourteenth 
Amendment supports a freestanding claim for actual innocence.”) (citing Herrera, 
506 U.S. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 429 (White, J., concurring); id. at 
435 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
98. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 430-31 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice 
Blackmun noted that the Court “really” had been “asked to decide whether the 
Constitution forbids the execution of a person who has been validly convicted and 
sentenced but who, nonetheless, can prove his innocence with newly discovered 
evidence.” Id. at 430-31. In Justice Blackmun’s view, the answer to this question is 
clear: “Despite the State of Texas’ astonishing protestation to the contrary, I do not 
see how the answer can be anything but ‘yes.’” Id. at 431 (citation omitted). Thus, 
according to the dissenting Justices, the Court should have held that an inmate on 
death row who could prove that he was probably innocent would be entitled to 
federal habeas relief and then remanded the case to the federal district court for an 
evidentiary hearing at which Herrera could attempt to prove his innocence. Id. at 
430.
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of an innocent person." In Justice Blackmun’s words, “[njothing 
could be more contrary to contemporary standards of decency, or 
more shocking to the conscience, than to execute a person who is 
actually innocent.”100
If the question were confined to whether the Constitution 
prohibits the execution of an innocent person, these three Justices 
clearly would have so held. The Herrera dissent, however, did not 
resolve whether the Constitution also prohibits the continued 
incarceration of an innocent person. The dissent noted that “[i]t also 
may violate the Eighth Amendment to imprison someone who is 
actually innocent,” because “‘[e]ven one day in prison would be a 
cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common 
cold.”’101 The dissent recognized, however, that as the Court had 
“noted” in the past, “death is different” from imprisonment in “both its 
severity and its finality.”102 Because unconstitutional incarceration 
was not the question before the Court, the dissent went no further than 
these observations.103
Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the majority took the 
position that if the Constitution forbids the execution of an innocent 
person, it must also forbid the imprisonment of an innocent person.104 
The majority noted that Herrera had not asserted an error in the
99. Id. at 430-36. Justice Blackmun explained that the Eighth Amendment 
“reflects evolving standards of decency” and prohibits “excessive” punishment. Id. 
at 431. The Court had previously held that death was excessive punishment even for 
crimes as serious as rape; in his view, if execution is an “excessive punishment for 
rape,” it is certainly an even more excessive punishment for “someone who is 
actually innocent.” Id. Thus, according to Justice Blackmun, the execution of one 
who can prove innocence would violate the Eighth Amendment because it is “at 
odds with any standard of decency that I can imagine.” Id. Similarly, the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits government action that “‘shocks the conscience’”; 
yet nothing, argued Justice Blackmun, could be “more shocking to the conscience” 
than to “execute a person who is actually innocent.” Id. at 435-37 (quoting Rochin 
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)). Thus, the “execution of a person who can 
show that he is innocent comes perilously close to simple murder.” Id. at 446.
100. Id. at 430 (citations omitted) (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 
406 (1986); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
101. Id. at 432 n.2 (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962)).
102. Id. (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980))
103. Id.
104. Id. at 405 (majority opinion).
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imposition of the death sentence, but rather “that a fundamental error 
was made in finding him guilty . . .  in the first place.” 105 Thus, merely 
to vacate Herrera’s death sentence would be “scarcely logical”: “[i]t 
would be a rather strange jurisprudence, in these circumstances, which 
held that under our Constitution he could not be executed, but that he 
could spend the rest of his life in prison.” 106
ii. The Nuance of Justice O ’Connor
Justice O’Connor began her concurrence with an oft-cited and 
relatively straightforward statement: “I cannot disagree with the 
fundamental legal principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent 
with the Constitution.” 107 However, Justice O’Connor then continued 
that, “[r]egardless of the verbal formula,. . .  the execution of a legally 
and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable 
event.” 108 Herein lies the rub: Justice O’Connor reiterated Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s view that Herrera was legally guilty because he 
was convicted following a trial during which he received all the 
constitutional protections to which a criminal defendant is entitled. 109 
By this reasoning, however, no defendant who received a procedurally 
fair trial could be legally innocent once convicted. 110 The clause of
105. Id.
106. Id. More recently, in 2009, the Supreme Court assumed without deciding 
that innocence is a freestanding constitutional claim in a non-capital case. Dist. 
Att’y’s Office for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71-72 (2009). The 
Court in 2009 did not discuss the fact that it was extending this assumption outside 
of the context of execution for the first time. Id. This extension supports the 
Herrera Court’s suggestion that the Constitution cannot forbid the execution of the 
innocent but permit their incarceration. Certainly, it would be difficult to argue that 
the Constitution forbids the execution of an innocent person, but permits a sentence 
of life without the possibility of parole—what a colleague has aptly described as the 
“passive aggressive death penalty.” David Ball, Professor, Santa Clara University 
School of Law.
107. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Presumably, if a convicted person were provided an opportunity to 
present the evidence of innocence and the court found the person actually innocent, 
the person would then be legally innocent. But such a system renders the innocent 
inmate incapable of obtaining federal habeas relief as he must prove that he is 
legally innocent to obtain review of his actual innocence claim by the federal courts,
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“legal” innocence thus renders a freestanding claim of innocence a 
nullity; innocence is not a freestanding constitutional claim if it 
requires an independent constitutional violation.
What meaning did Justices O’Connor and Kennedy intend to be 
extracted from their concurrence? Justice O’Connor argued that the 
question before the Court was narrow and procedural as opposed to 
substantive.* 111 The issue, according to her, was not whether a “State 
can execute the innocent” but rather “whether a fairly convicted and 
therefore legally guilty person is constitutionally entitled to yet 
another judicial proceeding in which to adjudicate his guilt anew, 10 
years after conviction, notwithstanding his failure to demonstrate that 
constitutional error infected his trial.”112 The answer, noted Justice 
O’Connor, would normally be no, as implied by the wording of the 
question.113 However, because of the “disturbing nature” of Herrera’s 
argument, and because this question “implicates not just the life of a 
single individual, but also the State’s powerful and legitimate interest 
in punishing the guilty, and the nature of state-federal relations,” 
Justice O’Connor argued that resolving the question was “neither 
necessary nor advisable.”114
Thus, there is language within the concurrence that supports the 
proposition that these two Justices would have held that innocence is a 
constitutional claim.115 After all, as noted above, Justice O’Connor 
began by stating that she could not disagree with the fundamental 
principle that executing the innocent is at odds with the 
Constitution.116 This comment, along with the nuances of her 
analysis, certainly implies that if the facts supported a compelling 
claim of innocence, and the execution of an innocent prisoner were 
pending, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy would have held that actual 
innocence is a freestanding constitutional claim.
but he cannot obtain the status of legal innocence until his actual innocence claim is
reviewed and a court finds him to be innocent.
111. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 420 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 420-21.
115. Id. at 419-27.
116. Id. at 419.
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Hi. Justice White: Proposing a Standard
In his short opinion explaining why he concurred in the judgment, 
Justice White simply stated that “[i]n voting to affirm, he assume[d] 
that a [truly] persuasive showing of ‘actual innocence’ made after 
trial. . .  would render unconstitutional” Herrera’s execution. 117 “To 
be entitled to relief, however, [Herrera] would at the very least be 
required to show that based on proffered newly discovered evidence 
and the entire record before the jury that convicted him, ‘no rational 
trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ’” 118 
Justice White concurred in the decision to deny Herrera relief because 
Herrera’s evidence of innocence fell “far short of satisfying even” the 
minimum showing required by Justice White’s suggested standard. 119 
However, the fact that Justice White proposed a standard and also 
declined to join the majority opinion, which largely argued against 
innocence as a freestanding constitutional claim, suggests that he 
would have held that innocence is a freestanding constitutional claim 
were the evidence far more favorable to the petitioner.
iv. Votes for the Constitution’s Permission to Execute 
an Innocent Person
Given Chief Justice Rehnquist’s discussion suggesting that neither 
the Eighth Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections 
were triggered by Herrera’s claim of innocence, there is no basis upon 
which to argue that Chief Justice Rehnquist would have held that 
innocence is a freestanding constitutional claim.
Likewise, it is clear that Justices Scalia and Thomas would have 
held that innocence is not a freestanding constitutional claim. Indeed, 
in perhaps the most surprising concurrence, Justice Scalia stated that 
the Court should have held that the Constitution permits the execution 
of a person who was fairly convicted, notwithstanding any new 
evidence to prove his innocence. 120 In Justice Scalia’s words, “as the 
Court’s discussion shows, it is perfectly clear what the answer is:
117. Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring).
118. Id. (last alteration in original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 
324(1979)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 428-29 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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There is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice (if 
that were enough) for finding in the Constitution a right to demand 
judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence 
brought forward after conviction.”121
Justice Scalia scolded the dissenters for applying “nothing but 
their personal opinions” to find the execution of a fairly convicted, but 
innocent person unconstitutional.122 “If the system that has been in 
place for 200 years (and remains widely approved) ‘shock[s]’ the 
dissenters’ consciences, perhaps they should doubt the calibration of 
their consciences, or, better still, the usefulness of ‘conscience 
shocking’ as a legal test.”123 Justice Scalia could not have known that 
the system that had been in place for two centuries would be 
completely revamped once the reality that innocent people can be 
convicted became undeniable.
v. Tallying the Votes
There is a strong argument that six of the Justices, as detailed 
above, would have held that innocence is a freestanding constitutional 
claim.124 Unfortunately, five of these six Justices—Justices White, 
Blackmun, O’Connor, Stevens, and Souter—are no longer on the 
Court. Moreover, this argument has not yet successfully convinced 
the federal courts that innocence claims require federal constitutional 
protections.
121. Id. at 427-28. Justice Scalia argued that the Court should have answered 
the question upon which it had granted certiorari: “whether it violates due process or 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for a State to execute a person who, having 
been convicted of murder after a full and fair trial, later alleges that newly 
discovered evidence shows him to be ‘actually innocent.’” Id. at 427. However, 
despite reservations about its approach, Justice Scalia joined the Court’s opinion 
“because there is no legal error in deciding a case by assuming, arguendo, that an 
asserted constitutional right exists” and he understood “the reluctance of the present 
Court to admit publicly that Our Perfect Constitution lets stand any injustice, much 
less the execution of an innocent man who has received, though to no avail, all the 
process that our society has traditionally deemed adequate.” Id. at 428 (footnote 
omitted).
122. Id. at 428.
123. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
124. See discussion supra Part I.C.4.i-iv.
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vi. A Hint o f Light: Recent Guidance from the Court
The Supreme Court has offered two further pieces of guidance 
since Herrera. As discussed above, the Supreme Court assumed 
without deciding in a 2009 decision that innocence is a freestanding 
constitutional claim in a non-capital case.125 More importantly, in a 
one-paragraph opinion, also in 2009, the Supreme Court remanded 
Troy Davis’s case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Georgia for an evidentiary hearing on Davis’s actual innocence 
claim.126 The Court directed the lower court to “receive testimony 
and make findings of fact as to whether evidence that could not have 
been obtained at the time of trial clearly establishes petitioner’s 
innocence.”127 The majority opinion was silent as to its underlying 
rationale and provided no authority, explanation, or discussion to 
support its decision.128
Justices Scalia and Thomas, however, dissented, arguing that 
there is no federal constitutional innocence claim: thus Justices Scalia 
and Thomas implicitly recognized that the majority’s decision 
supports the argument that innocence is a freestanding constitutional 
claim.129 Further, the dissenters argued that, even if the lower court 
held that innocence is a constitutional claim, it could not grant relief 
under AEDPA because the state court’s denial of the innocence claim 
was not “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, ‘clearly 
established’” Supreme Court law.130 According to Justice Scalia, the 
Supreme Court had thus sent the district court on “a fool’s errand.”131
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia found 
that innocence is a freestanding constitutional claim, at least in the 
capital context, because the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
125. Dist. Att’y’s Office for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71-72 
(2009); see also discussion supra note 106 and accompanying text.
126. In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 952 (2009).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 955 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)) (“A state court cannot possibly have 
contravened, or even unreasonably applied, ‘clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ by rejecting a type of claim 
that the Supreme Court has not once accepted as valid.”).
131. Id. at 957.
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execution of an innocent person.132 However, the district court also 
found that Mr. Davis’s evidence was not sufficiently persuasive to 
meet the high burden required to establish innocence and thus did not 
have to resolve the question of relief.133
H. A N ew  C o nstitu tio n a l  A n alysis of In n o cen ce  as a
F reesta n d in g  C laim
In 1993, when the Supreme Court discussed whether innocence is 
a freestanding constitutional claim in Herrera v. Collins, very few 
people had been exonerated by DNA evidence.134 Today, however, at 
least 316 people have been exonerated by DNA evidence; nearly one 
thousand have been exonerated without DNA evidence.135
In response to DNA exonerations, state legislatures recognized the 
need to change the procedures in place for handling innocence claims 
in order to reflect evolving standards of decency and modem 
awareness regarding the requirements of fundamental fairness.136 In 
1993, only nine states placed no time limits on motions for new trials 
based on evidence of innocence, while the vast majority limited the 
time for presenting such motions to a short period after conviction.137 
State laws have changed drastically since then.138
132. In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *37-43 (S.D. Ga. 
Aug. 24, 2010).
133. Id. at *1,61.
134. See Samuel R. Gross & M ichael Shaffer, Nat’l Reg’y of 
Exonerations, Exonerations in the United States, 1989-2012, at 21 (June 
2012), http://www.law.umich.edu/speciaEexoneration/Documents/exonerations 
_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf (noting that the total number of DNA exonerations 
from 1989 to 1993 was 16, and the total number of DNA exonerations from 2008 to 
2012 was 92).
135. DNA Exoneree Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014); The Registry, 
Exonerations and False Convictions, N a t ’l  R e g ’y  OF EXONERATIONS, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/leammore.aspx (last visited 
June 21, 2014).
136. See infra note 140 (discussing the state-by-state standards for handling 
actual innocence claims).
137. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 410-11 (1993).
138. See infra note 140 (discussing the state-by-state standards for handling 
actual innocence claims).
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Currently, all fifty states and the District of Columbia recognize 
the post-conviction right to develop DNA evidence relevant to 
innocence, and all have deemed that right to be worthy of statutory 
protection. 139 Further, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia 
now allow post-conviction claims of innocence without time limits 
related to the conviction date; not a single one requires an independent 
constitutional violation, or a showing that the inmate was deprived of 
a fair trial, in order to obtain relief. 140 Only Delaware continues to
139. Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Access_To_PostConviction_DNA_Testin 
g.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
140. See A l a . R. C r im . P. 32.1(e)(5); A l a . R. C r im . P. 32 .2 (c) (requiring 
motions based on “newly discovered material facts” that establish innocence be 
brought within six months of the discovery of those facts); ALASKA St a t . 
§ 12.72.020(b) (2008) (courts may hear claims based on “newly discovered 
evidence” that establishes innocence by “clear and convincing evidence” and which 
were presented with “due diligence”); A r iz . Rev. St a t . A n n . § 13-4240(K) (2014) 
(“Notwithstanding any other provision of law that would bar a hearing as untimely, 
if the results of [post-conviction DNA] testing are favorable to the petitioner, the 
court shall order a hearing and make any further orders that are required. . . . ”); 
A r k . CODE A n n . § 16-112-201 (a)( 1 )-(2) (2005) (“Except when direct appeal is 
available, a [convicted person] may commence a proceeding to secure relief’ if 
“[scientific evidence not available at trial establishes . . .  actual innocence” or the 
“scientific predicate for the claim could not have been previously discovered 
through the exercise of due diligence and the facts underlying the claim. . .  would 
be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact­
finder would find the petitioner guilty of the underlying offense.”); In re Clark, 855 
P.2d 729, 760-61 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (holding that procedural bars to habeas 
petitions based on “newly discovered evidence” do not apply if the petitioner is 
“actually innocent”); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35(c)(3)(IV), (VII)(b) (providing right to 
make application for post-conviction relief based on “evidence that could not have 
been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence”); Farrar v. People, 
208 P.3d 702, 706-07 (Colo. 2009) (en banc) (explaining that “newly discovered 
evidence” must be discovered through “due diligence” and must be “affirmatively 
probative of the defendant’s innocence”); Boles v. Comm’r of Corr., 874 A.2d 820, 
823 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (“[A] substantial claim of actual innocence is cognizable 
by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus . . . .  To prevail on a claim of actual 
innocence, the petitioner must satisfy two criteria”: (1) “establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that. . .  he is actually innocent” and (2) “establish that. . .  no 
reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty” in light of all the evidence, 
(first alteration in original) (quoting Player v. Comm’r of Corr., 808 A.2d 1140, 
1142-43 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002))); Williams v. Comm’r of Corr., 677 A.2d 1, 8 
(Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (In raising a claim based on “newly discovered evidence, a 
petitioner must demonstrate . . .  that the proffered evidence . . .  could not have been
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discovered earlier by the exercise of due diligence.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 
4504(b) (2014) (allowing “motion for a new trial” based on “DNA evidence not 
available at trial” that “establishes.. . actual innocence” and setting standard of 
“clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable trier of fact, considering [all of 
the evidence,] would have convicted the person”); D.C. C o d e  § 22-4135(d)(l), (f) 
(2009) (allowing motion to vacate conviction or grant a new trial on the ground of 
actual innocence and requiring an affidavit stating that the “new evidence [of 
innocence] was not deliberately withheld by the movant for purposes of strategic 
advantage,” and permitting dismissal of claims “if the government demonstrates that 
it has been materially prejudiced in its ability to respond to the motion by the delay 
in its filing, unless the movant shows that the motion is based on grounds which the 
movant could not have raised by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the 
circumstances prejudicial to the government occurred”); Fla. R. CRIM. P. 3.853 
(allowing motion for post-conviction DNA testing “any time” after “judgment and 
sentence” are “final” when there is a “reasonable probability that the movant would 
have been acquitted or would have received a lesser sentence if the DNA evidence 
had been admitted at trial”); Zollman v. State, 820 So.2d 1059, 1060, 1062-63 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (granting motion for DNA testing 23 years after conviction 
upon finding that the requested DNA testing would exonerate defendant if results 
excluded him); Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335, 347-48 (Ga. 2011) (citing G a . 
C o d e  A n n . § 9-14-48(d)) (discussing actual innocence exception to procedural 
defaults, including timeliness); H a w . R e v . St a t . § 844D-121 (2006) (allowing post­
conviction motion for DNA testing “at any time”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4902(b), 
(f) (2012) (authorizing motion for DNA testing at “any time,” and requiring the 
court to grant relief if the “fingerprint or forensic DNA test results demonstrate . . .  
that the petitioner” did not commit the crime); People v. Ortiz, 919 N.E.2d 941, 948, 
950 (111. 2009) (affirming grant of new trial based on “newly discovered evidence” 
of actual innocence more than 10 years after conviction, and reiterating that actual 
innocence excuses defendants from having to show “cause and prejudice” for 
procedural default); IND. R. P. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES 1(1 )(a) (proceeding for 
post-conviction relief may be brought at “any time”); Kubsch v. State, 934 N.E.2d 
1138, 1145 (Ind. 2010) (“‘[N]ew evidence will mandate a new trial only when the 
defendant demonstrates [among other things] that. . .  the evidence has been 
discovered since the trial,. . . due diligence was used to discover it in time for 
trial,. .. and. . .  it will probably produce a different result at retrial.’” (first 
alteration in original) (quoting Taylor v. State, 840 N.E. 2d 324, 329 (Ind. 2006))); 
IOWA C o d e  § 822.2(1 )(d) (2006) (authorizes vacating conviction based on 
“evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires 
vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice”); Summage v. State, 
579 N.W.2d 821, 822 (1998) (“The applicant must show... [that] the evidence 
could not have been discovered earlier in the exercise of due diligence . . . . ”); KAN. 
St a t . An n . § 21-2512(a), (f)(2) (2013) (providing for DNA testing “any time after 
conviction” for murder or rape, and authorizing relief if “results of [post-conviction] 
DNA testing” are “favorable to the petitioner” and “of such materiality that a 
reasonable probability exists that the new evidence would result in a different 
outcome”) deemed unconstitutional as applied by State v. Cheeks, 310 P.3d 346,
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356 (Kan. 2013), and State v. Denney, 101 P.3d 1257, 1269 (Kan. 2004); KY. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 422.285 (West 2014) (requests for DNA testing may be made “at any 
time” by petitioners convicted of certain designated crimes); Bowling v. 
Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361, 372-73 (Ky. 2005) (discussing actual innocence 
exception to requiring a showing of cause and prejudice for procedural default); La . 
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 851 (2014) (authorizing motions for new trial based on 
““[n]ew and material evidence that, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable 
diligence . . .  was not discovered before or during the trial,. . . and. .. would 
probably have changed the verdict or judgment of guilty”), amended by Act No. 
564, 2014 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 564 (West); La. CODE CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 
926.1 (2011) (requiring that motions for DNA testing be “timely”); Me. Rev. Stat. 
tit. 15, § 2138(10)(A) (2013) (placing no time limit on granting a new trial based on 
DNA test results that, in light of all of the evidence, prove actual innocence); Md . R. 
4-331(c)(2-3) (authorizing motion for new trial at “any time” if sentenced to death 
and defendant can show innocence through “newly discovered evidence,” or 
authorizing motion for new trial at “any time” if “based on DNA . . .  testing . . .  or 
other generally accepted scientific techniques the results of which. . .  show” 
innocence); Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a)-(b) (motion for new trial may be made and 
granted at “any time if it appears that justice may not have been done”); M ich. 
COMP. Laws Ann. § 770.16(2), (8) (West 2014) (requiring motions for DNA testing 
be filed no later than January 1, 2016, and authorizing motion for new trial if DNA 
results exclude defendant and defendant establishes by “clear and convincing 
evidence” that “only the perpetrator of the crime . . .  could be the source of the 
identified biological material”); Minn. Stat. § 590.01(4)(b)(2) (2005) (excusing 
petitioners from two-year time limit based on “newly discovered evidence . . . that 
could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence . . .  within the two- 
year time period .. . and [which] establishes by a clear and convincing standard that 
the petitioner is innocent”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-39-5(2)(a)(ii) (2009) (providing 
exception from three-year statute of limitation for motions for relief in which there 
is “biological evidence . . .  that can be subjected to additional DNA testing . . .  and 
that testing would demonstrate by reasonable probability that the petitioner would 
not have been convicted . . .  if favorable results had been obtained . . .  at the time of 
the original prosecution”); State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 546-47 
(Mo. 2003) (en banc) (reiterating that courts will hear constitutional claims not 
raised within the time period provided under Missouri law when the petitioner 
shows actual innocence by the “preponderance of the evidence”); Mont. Code 
ANN. § 46-21-110(1), (10) (2003) (allowing motion for DNA testing at any time 
during incarceration and authorizing post-conviction proceedings “test results are 
favorable to the petitioner”); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2101 (2013) (authorizing new 
trial based on “newly discovered exculpatory DNA” evidence or any “newly 
discovered [material] evidence” that the petitioner “could not with reasonable 
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial”); Neb. Rev . STAT. § 29-4120 
(2001) (authorizing motion for DNA testing “at any time after conviction”); N.H. 
Rev . Stat. Ann. § 651-D:2(I), (VI)(b) (2010) (authorizing motion for DNA testing 
“at any time after conviction,” and stating that, “if the results of DNA testing . . .  are 
favorable to the petitioner,” the court “shall enter any order that serves the interests
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of justice, including an order vacating . .. the judgment. . .  or granting a new trial”); 
N.J. Stat . An n . § 2A:84A-32a(a), (d)(5) (West 2002) (authorizing motion for post­
conviction testing at any time during imprisonment if it raises a “reasonable 
probability” that “favorable” test results would lead to the granting of a motion for 
new trial); State v. DeMarco, 904 A.2d 797, 804 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) 
(“To be entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant 
must demonstrate [among other things] that the new evidence [was] discovered 
since the trial and [was] not discoverable by reasonable diligence beforehand . . . . ” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Carter, 426 A.2d 501, 508 (NJ. 
1981))); N.M. Stat. An n . § 31-1A-2(A), (H) (West 2005) (authorizing motion for 
DNA testing without time limit and, when DNA tests are “exculpatory,” permitting 
the court to “set aside the petitioner’s judgment and sentence,” “dismiss the charges 
against the petitioner with prejudice,” “grant the petitioner a new trial,” or “order 
other appropriate relief’); N.Y. Crim . Proc. Law  § 440.10(g)-(g-l) (McKinney 
2014) (authorizing motion to vacate judgment based on new evidence that “could 
not have been produced” at trial “with due diligence on [the petitioner’s] part” and 
which “create[s] a probability that . . .  the verdict would have been more favorable 
to the defendant” or based on “[f]orensic DNA testing of evidence performed” any 
time “since the entry of a judgment”); N.C. GEN. Stat . § 15A-1415(c) (2013) 
(allowing, “at any time after verdict,” motions for relief based on new evidence that 
“direct[ly] and materially] bear[s]” on innocence, which was “unknown or 
unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial” and “could not with due diligence 
have been discovered” earlier); N.D. CENT. Code § 29-32.1-15 (2005) (authorizing 
post-conviction DNA testing without time limit where evidence is “materially 
relevant” to “actual innocence”); Ohio Re v . Code A n n . § 2953.21(A)(1)(a) 
(LexisNexis 2013) (authorizing petition for post-conviction relief for any person 
convicted of a felony who has DNA results that “establish, by clear and convincing 
evidence, actual innocence”); Ohio Re v . Code A nn . § 2953.23(A)(2) (LexisNexis 
2013) (excluding from time limits petitioners with DNA test results that “establish, 
by clear and convincing evidence, actual innocence”); Okla . Stat. tit. 22, § 
1080(d) (2013) (allowing, without time limit, post-conviction relief where there 
“exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires 
vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice”); Or . Re v . STAT. § 
138.690 (2007) (permitting motion for DNA testing at any time while the person is 
incarcerated or if the person was convicted of “murder or a sex crime”); OR. Re v . 
STAT. § 138.510(3) (2007) (placing a two-year time limit on post-conviction 
motions “unless the court. . .  finds grounds for relief asserted which could not 
reasonably have been raised” earlier); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a), (b) (1997) 
(authorizing motion for post-conviction relief when “exculpatory evidence” that was 
“unavailable[e] at the time of trial” later “become[s] available and would have 
changed the outcome of the trial if it had been introduced,” except when the 
“Commonwealth has been prejudiced either in its ability to respond to the petition or 
in its ability to re-try the petitioner,” unless the “petition is based on grounds of 
which the petitioner could not have discovered by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence before the delay became prejudicial to the Commonwealth”); 42 Pa . CONS. 
STAT. Ann. § 9543.1(f)(1) (2002) (authorizing post-conviction DNA testing without
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time limit and petitions for post-conviction relief within 60 days of receipt of 
favorable test results); DeCiantis v. State, 24 A.3d 557, 569 (R.I. 2011) (“‘[T]he 
remedy of postconviction relief is available to any person who has been convicted of 
a crime and who thereafter alleges either that the conviction violated the applicant’s 
constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered material facts requires 
vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice.”" (quoting Page v. State, 995 
A.2d 934, 942 (R.I. 2010))); S.C. R. CRIM. Proc. 29(b) (“A motion for a new trial 
based on after-discovered evidence must be made within one (1) year after the date 
of actual discovery of the evidence by the defendant or after the date when the 
evidence could have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”); 
State v. Needs, 508 S.E.2d 857, 869 (S.C. 1998) (“To prevail on a motion for a new 
trial based on after discovered evidence, a defendant must show (1) the evidence is 
such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted; (2) the evidence has 
been discovered since the trial; (3) the evidence could not have been discovered 
prior to trial by the exercise of due diligence; (4) the evidence is material; and (5) 
the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching.”); S.D. Codified Laws § 23- 
5B-l(5)-(6) (2009) (allowing order for DNA testing when there is “good cause for 
the failure to request” DNA testing at trial, and the petitioner did not “[kjknowingly 
and voluntarily waive the right to request DNA testing” or “fail to request DNA 
testing in a prior petition for relief’); Tenn. Code Ann . § 40-30-303 (2001) 
(allowing anyone convicted of murder, rape, sexual battery, the “attempted 
commission” or “lesser included offense” of any of these offenses, or, with the 
judge’s permission, “any other offense” to request post-conviction DNA testing at 
“any time”); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann . art. 64.01(b) (West 2014) (permitting 
motion for DNA testing when the evidence was either “not previously subjected to 
DNA testing” or “can be subjected to testing with newer testing techniques that 
provide a reasonable likelihood of results that are more accurate and probative than 
the previous test”); Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d 538, 544-546 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2006) (reiterating that the incarceration of an innocent person violates due process, 
that “claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence are cognizable 
on post-conviction writs of habeas corpus,” and that such evidence is “evidence that 
was not known to the applicant at the time of trial [or during the time for a motion 
for a new trial] and could not be known to him even with the exercise of due 
diligence”); UTAH CODE An n . § 78B-9-402 (West 2014) (allowing petition for 
factual innocence based on “newly discovered material evidence,” when that 
“evidence could not have been discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner’s 
counsel through the exercise of reasonable diligence” in time to “include the 
evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or postconviction motion,” or the 
“court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to exercise reasonable 
diligence in uncovering the evidence”); VT. Stat. An n . tit. 13, §§ 5561, 5569 
(2007) (authorizing petition for post-conviction DNA testing at “any time” and, if 
the test results are favorable to the petitioner, authorizing the court to set aside the 
judgment of conviction, order a new trial, order the petitioner discharged from 
custody, or any other relief the “court deems appropriate”); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2- 
327.1 l(A)(iv), (vi) (2013) (authorizing writ of actual innocence based on newly 
discovered evidence that was “previously unknown or unavailable to petitioner or
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limit the time for developing and presenting innocence claims based 
on DNA evidence to the conviction date.141 However, there are
his trial attorney of record at the time the conviction . . .  became final,” and “could 
not, by the exercise of diligence, have been discovered or obtained before the 
expiration of 21 days following entry of the final order of conviction” by the court); 
Turner v. Commonwealth, 694 S.E.2d 251, 260 (Va. Ct. App. 2010) (discussing 
requirements for petition for a writ of actual innocence based on newly discovered 
evidence), aff’d\ 111 S.E.2d 111 (Va. 2011); In re Weber, 284 P.3d 734, 740 (Wash. 
2012) (en banc) (Petitioner raising actual innocence claim to overcome procedural 
bars such as timeliness to other constitutional claims must prove to the court that, in 
light of new evidence, ‘“it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would 
have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”’ (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 
513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995))); In re Carter, 263 P.3d 1241, 1248-50 (Wash. 2011) (en 
banc) (holding that “actual innocence doctrine” is an “equitable exception to the 
time bar[s] that appl[y]” to challenging criminal convictions); State ex rel. Smith v. 
McBride, 681 S.E.2d 81, 91(W. Va. 2009) (Motions for new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence will not be granted unless the evidence was discovered after 
trial, the defendant was “diligent in ascertaining and securing” the evidence, and 
“due diligence would not have secured it before the verdict.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting In re Renewed Investigation of State Police Crime Lab.; 
Serology Div., 633 S.E.2d 762, 763 (2006))); Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Bankr. Estate 
of Lake Geneva Sugar Shack, Inc., by Waldschmidt, 572 N.W.2d 881, 894 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1997) (Courts ‘“may grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence’” 
only if “‘(1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) the moving party was not 
negligent in seeking the evidence;. .. and (5) it is reasonably probable that a 
different result would be reached at a new trial.’” (quoting State v. Terrance J.W., 
550 N.W.2d 445, 447 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996))); WYO. Stat. ANN. § 7-12-303(b) 
(2008) (“Notwithstanding any law or rule of procedure that bars a motion for a new 
trial as untimely, a convicted person may use the results of a DNA test ordered 
pursuant to this act as grounds for filing a motion for new trial.”); Brown v. State, 
816 P.2d 818, 820 (Wyo. 1991) (The standard for motions for new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence “requires th a t.. .  (1) The evidence has come to 
defendant’s knowledge since the trial; (2) it was not owing to a want of due 
diligence that it was not discovered sooner;. . . . ”).
Finally, even AEDPA, which further limited federal habeas review of state 
petitions, includes a provision allowing state prisoners to raise claims based on 
newly discovered evidence within one year of when that evidence “could have been 
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) 
(1996).
141. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(a) (2014) (requiring motions for DNA 
testing to be filed “not . . .  more than 3 years after the judgment of conviction is 
final”). A “person convicted of a crime” may bring a “motion for a new trial” based 
on DNA evidence “if the person establishes by clear and convincing evidence that 
no reasonable trier of fact,” considering all of the evidence now available, “would 
have convicted the person.” Id. § 4504(b). Many states have due diligence
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proposals to remove the three-year time limit from Delaware’s post­
conviction relief statute. 142
This evolution of state law evidences the emerging modem 
consensus that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the continued 
punishment of the innocent and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires judicial review of compelling claims 
of innocence, irrespective of how long after conviction new evidence 
is discovered.
A. Fundamental Fairness Requires Judicial Review
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
protection against state actions that violate ‘“fundamental 
fairness. ’” 143 The Supreme Court has explained that “widely shared 
practice” is one of the “concrete indicators of what fundamental 
fairness and rationality require.” 144 “The near-uniform application” of 
a rule of criminal procedure can show that such a mle is so 
fundamental that the lack thereof “offends a principle of justice that is 
deeply rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people.” 145
requirements for discovering and presenting post-conviction evidence of innocence, 
while other states have no time limits or other procedural bars to actual innocence 
claims, but time limits are not based on conviction date except in Delaware. See 
sources cited supra note 140.
142. E.g., Innocence Project, supra note 139 (DNA testing laws should 
“[e]xclude . . . absolute deadlines” for “access to post-conviction DNA evidence” 
and “[d]isallow procedural hurdles that stymie DNA testing petitions and 
proceedings that govern other forms of post-conviction relief. . . . ”).
143. See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990) 
(considering whether the admission of certain evidence is “so extremely unfair that 
its admission violates ‘fundamental conceptions of justice’” (quoting United States 
v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1990))); see also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 
437, 448 (1992) (If there is “no historical basis for concluding that [a rule] violates 
due process, we turn to consider whether the rule transgresses any recognized 
principle of ‘fundamental fairness’ in operation.” (quoting Dowling, 493 U.S. at 
352)). In Lovasco, the Court stated that its task was to determine whether the 
complained of action “violates those ‘fundamental conceptions of justice which lie 
at the base of our civil and political institutions,’ and which define ‘the community’s 
sense of fair play and decency.’” Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790 (citations omitted).
144. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 640 (1991).
145. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 362 (1996) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
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There is now a widely shared practice among states of providing 
judicial review for compelling claims of innocence.146 Further, there 
is near-uniform application among states of the rule that innocence 
claims are not barred by conviction-related time limits.147 Thus, this 
widely shared practice and near-uniform rule demonstrate that the 
right to have courts consider new evidence of innocence, no matter 
how long after conviction the evidence is discovered, is so 
fundamental that the refusal to entertain such evidence would 
“offend[] a principle of justice that is deeply rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people.”148 As a result, the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that federal courts review 
compelling claims of innocence.
The right to judicial review of post-conviction claims of 
innocence arguably has always existed, lying dormant while the 
prospect of an innocent person in prison was deemed theoretical. 
When scientific evidence definitely proved that innocent people had 
been wrongfully convicted, the states reacted quickly and with near­
uniformity to remove the time bars and other restrictions that once 
limited the availability of mechanisms for proving innocence.149 As 
one state court explained, “[hjaving recognized the prospect of an 
intolerable wrong, the state has provided a remedy.”150
The majority’s discussion in Herrera v. Collins also supports the 
conclusion that innocence claims fall within the protections of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court in 1993 pointed to state 
practices, which, at the time, restricted the availability of post­
conviction innocence claims to a short time after conviction, to 
suggest in dicta that due process was not offended by “Texas’ refusal
146. See supra note 140.
147. See supra note 140.
148. Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362 (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. See supra note 140 (discussing the state-by-state standards for handling 
actual innocence claims).
150. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Mo. 2003) (en 
banc). Further, Texas’s highest court “recognized” in 1996, just three years after it 
had refused to entertain Herrera’s evidence of innocence, “that ‘the incarceration of 
an innocent person is as much a violation of the Due Process Clause as is the 
execution of such a person.’” Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2006) (quoting Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1996)).
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to entertain” Herrera’s evidence of innocence eight years after Herrera 
was convicted. 151 In light of current state practices, however, the 
Court’s analysis now compels the different conclusion that due 
process is offended by the failure to entertain persuasive evidence of 
innocence, regardless of how long after conviction it is discovered.
Moreover, while “[historical practice is probative” of the 
existence of a due process right, a “historical basis” for the right is not 
a necessity. 152 As the Supreme Court has explained, “to hold that 
such a characteristic is essential to due process of law would be to 
deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of 
progress or improvement.” 153 Rather, it is more consistent with our 
“historical legal institutions to say that the spirit of personal liberty 
and individual right, which they embodied, was preserved and 
developed by a progressive growth and wise adaptation to new 
circumstances . . .  of the forms and processes found fit to give . . .  new 
expression and greater effect to modem ideas” of fairness. 154
More recently, the Supreme Court noted the evolving nature of 
due process, explaining that, “[h]istory and tradition are the starting 
point but not in all cases the ending point of the . . .  inquiry.” 155 
Indeed, recent laws and developing traditions may be more relevant 
than older laws because they show “an emerging awareness that 
liberty gives substantial protection” to the right in question. 156 The 
changes in state laws and traditions over the past two decades reflect 
an emerging awareness of the reality that innocent people are 
wrongfully convicted and that fundamental fairness requires that the 
innocent have an ongoing right to judicial review of newly discovered 
evidence of innocence.
Supreme Court precedent confirms that due process must be 
“flexible]” to protect the innocent and “minimiz[e] the risk of
151. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,410-11 (1993).
152. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448 (1992) (“Discerning no 
historical basis for concluding that [a rule] violates due process, we turn to consider 
whether the rule transgresses any recognized principle of ‘fundamental fairness’ in 
operation.” (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990))).
153. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884).
154. Id. at 530.
155. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (quoting Cnty. of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
156. Id. at 571-72.
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error.”157 Due process, ‘“unlike some legal rules, is not a technical 
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and 
circumstance.’”158 The Court has explained that this “flexibility is 
necessary to gear the process to the particular need; the quantum and 
quality of the process due in a particular situation depend upon the 
need to serve the purpose of minimizing the risk of error.”159
B. Modern Consensus and Ancient Precedent Agree
The “reach” of the Eighth Amendment is “not static” but rather is 
“defined by looking beyond historical conceptions to ‘the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.’”160 The Eighth Amendment “bars punishment” that is 
“barbaric” or “excessive.”161 The Court has held that “a punishment 
is ‘excessive’ and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable 
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing 
more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and 
suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the 
crime.” 162 Punishing the innocent makes no measurable contribution 
to the acceptable goals of punishment and is grossly out of proportion 
to an innocent person’s complete lack of culpability.
In determining whether a punishment is prohibited, federal courts 
rely upon factors such as “public attitudes,” “legislative attitudes,” and 
Eighth Amendment precedent.163 “First, a court considers objective 
indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments
157. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 
(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
158. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 324 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 
U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
159. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
160. In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *39 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 
24, 2010) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)); see 
also Ford v. Wainwright, A ll U.S. 399, 406 (1986); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 
447, 465 (1984); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (explaining that 
the Eighth Amendment is not static, but rather reflects evolving or contemporary 
standards of decency and fairness).
161. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
162. Id.
163. See id. (discussing the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010).
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and state practice to determine whether there is a national consensus 
against the . . .  practice at issue.”164 Next, “the court must 
independently determine whether the punishment in question” 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment “based upon precedent and 
the court’s understanding and interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose.”165
The only federal court that has analyzed this question since 
Herrera v. Collins, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Georgia, concluded in 2010 that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the 
execution of an innocent person.166 The court reasoned that there was 
“consensus among the states .. . that a truly persuasive demonstration 
of innocence subsequent to trial renders [execution] unconstitutional”: 
this consensus, the court stated, was evidenced by the enactment of 
post-conviction DNA testing statutes in forty-seven states, along with 
the increasing abolition of the death penalty as wrongful convictions 
became the focus of widespread public attention.167 The court further 
reasoned that “executions of the ‘actually’ innocent do not serve any 
legitimate penological purpose.”168
Further evidence of modem consensus has emerged since the 
district court’s decision in In re Davis. As the district court noted 
then, “legislation is the clearest and most reliable objective evidence 
of contemporary values.”169 The enactment of post-conviction DNA 
testing statutes in every single state—statutes which, by their very 
nature, are designed to help the wrongfully convicted prove their 
innocence—demonstrates contemporary consensus prohibiting the
164. In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *40 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 61).
165. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008)).
166. In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *1.
167. Id. at *40-41, 43. At the time the district court decided the case, “forty- 
seven states and the District of Columbia ha[d] enacted [DNA testing] statutes 
designed to help innocent convicts prove that their convictions were erroneous.” Id. 
at *40.
168. Id. at *43.
169. Id. at *40 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 323 (2002)).
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punishment of the innocent.170 As the In re Davis court pointed out, 
“if states were not concerned with preventing punishment of the 
wrongfully convicted, it would be difficult to understand why they 
would allow validly convicted persons avenues with which to secure 
evidence of their innocence.”171
Further, “precedent and [prior] understanding of the Eighth 
Amendment accord[] with this consensus.”172 The Supreme Court has 
ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are out of 
proportion to the level of culpability.173 For instance, the Supreme 
Court has held that death is excessive for certain crimes, including 
rape.174 Thus, if it is “violative of the Eighth Amendment to execute 
someone who is guilty of those crimes, then it plainly is violative of 
the Eighth Amendment to execute a person who is actually 
innocent.”175 Any punishment, but especially execution, is out of 
proportion to an innocent person’s complete lack of culpability.176 
After all, “‘[e]ven one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual 
punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.’” 177
170. See supra note 140 (discussing state-by-state standards for handling 
actual innocence claims). No DNA testing statute requires a showing of 
constitutional error or lack of fair trial in order to obtain post-conviction DNA 
testing. See sources cited supra note 140 and accompanying text.
171. In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *40.
172. Id. at *43. See also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995) (holding 
that an actual innocence claim may provide a “gateway” for a court to review an 
otherwise barred habeas claim, but the “evidence [of innocence] must establish 
sufficient doubt about. . .  guilt to justify the conclusion that. . .  execution would be 
a miscarriage of justice”).
173. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-98 (1982) (holding that 
death is an excessive penalty under the Eighth Amendment for a robber convicted of 
felony murder because he “did not kill or intend to kill and thus his culpability is 
plainly different from that of the [fellow] robbers who killed”); Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (holding that imposition of the death penalty “is grossly 
disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore 
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment”).
174. E.g., Coker, 433 U.S. at 598.
175. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 431 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
176. In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *40 n.22 (“[W]here the state attempts 
to punish an individual who has no culpability at all, the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the imposition of any punishment.” (citing Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660, 667(1962)).
177. Id. (quoting Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667).
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The protections of the Constitution were designed to accomplish 
‘“the twofold aim [of criminal justice]. . .  that guilt shall not escape or 
innocence suffer. ’” 178 “Indeed, concern about the injustice that results 
from the conviction of an innocent person has long been at the core of 
our criminal justice system.” 179 Supreme Court precedent also 
demonstrates that the Eighth Amendment requires additional 
procedures to ensure a punishment remains constitutional in light of 
new facts or intervening developments. 180 Newly discovered 
evidence of innocence fits perfectly within this doctrine.
Finally, punishments are unconstitutional if they “make[] no 
measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment.” 181 No 
“legitimate penological purpose” is served by punishing an innocent 
person, while the guilty person remains free. 182 “[Djeterrence is not 
served [by punishing the innocent] because there is no conduct to 
deter.” 183 Nor can retribution be served by punishing a person for 
crimes ‘“he did not commit and had no intention of committing’”
178. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (quoting Berger v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
179. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995). See also In re Davis, 2010 
WL 3385081, at *41 (“If there is a principle more firmly embedded in the fabric of 
the American legal system than that which proscribes punishment of the innocent, it 
is unknown to this Court.”).
180. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 590 (1988) (holding that petitioner 
was entitled to new hearing regarding whether he should be sentenced to death after 
a felony conviction that had been one of the aggravating circumstances was 
reversed); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406, 418 (1986) (holding that post­
conviction developments that raised doubts about the sanity of a man sentenced to 
death required an additional hearing to determine whether his execution was 
constitutional).
181. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
182. In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *42-43. In some cases with DNA 
exonerations, the real perpetrators had gone on to commit subsequent crimes for 
which they were later convicted. See, e.g., Kevin Green Case Profile, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Kevin_Green.php (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2014). Kevin Green, who was wrongfully convicted of murder, attempted 
murder, and assault with a deadly weapon, served nearly sixteen years in prison 
before semen from the crime scene was matched to another felon in the California 
DNA database. Id. “Gerald Parker, a serial killer called the ‘Bedroom Basher’ for 
breaking into women’s bedrooms to rape and kill them, confessed to the attack as 
well as five other murders” he had committed. Id.
183. In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *42.
216 Ca lifo rn ia  W estern  La w  Re v iew [Vol. 50
because doing so does not ‘“measurably contribute to . . .  ensuring 
that the criminal gets his just deserts.’”184 Incarcerating and executing 
the innocent simply makes no measurable contribution to acceptable 
goals of punishment.
Punishing the innocent is thus a clear violation of the Eighth 
Amendment. It is contrary to modem consensus and evolving 
standards of decency, and it is contrary to the principles that underlie 
the Eighth Amendment as the Supreme Court has interpreted it for 
hundreds of years.
III. In n o cen ce  P resu m ed  a nd  In no cen ce  Found
The use of the word ‘innocence’ in actual innocence claims may 
be connected to the unduly restrictive standards of proof required of 
petitioners in some states.185 Had these claims instead been called 
‘not guilty’ claims, they might not have evoked the immediate 
sympathy and strength of innocence claims, but they would have been 
equally well-founded under the law, equally deserving of 
constitutional protections, and the burden of proof for petitioners 
would have been much clearer from the beginning.186
While there is a difference between the meanings of ‘innocence’ 
and ‘not guilty,’ our criminal justice system is guided by the 
“fundamental” understanding that fairness and justice can only be 
achieved if innocence must be presumed unless guilt is proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt.187 As clinical professor and Innocence Network 
President Keith Findley argues in discussing “clear proof of 
innocence,” “to demand certainty [of innocence] is to demand the 
impossible,. . .  in the end, the best we can or should do is rely on the 
legal standards that define guilt and, absent proof of guilt, presume 
innocence.”188 When newly discovered evidence demonstrates there
184. Id. at *43 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
185. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
186. See discussion infra Part III.A.
187. See Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 1157, 1162, 
1189-90 (2011).
188. Id. Professor Findley goes on to state that “[ajnything less than that 
[presumption] invites endless controversy about subjective assessments of guilt and 
innocence, unwarranted insult and injury to the innocent who are forced to live
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is no longer sufficient proof of guilt, innocence must be presumed 
anew.
A. Presuming Innocence: Revisiting “Not Guilty ”
The Constitution prohibits punishment for a crime when there is 
insufficient “evidence for a rational trier of the facts to find guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”189 Thus far, the Supreme Court has only 
applied this rule to claims based entirely upon the evidence presented 
at trial.190 However, there is no reason a conviction following a trial 
in which the jury did not hear all of the evidence pointing to 
innocence should be entitled to more weight than a one in which the 
jury did hear all of the evidence.
As explained by the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Georgia, “there are three general reasons why a jury might 
reach an erroneous verdict”:
(1) a constitutional error led a jury to consider something 
inappropriate or caused patently important evidence to be withheld,
(2) a jury heard a set of facts that was complete at the time of trial 
but later found to be incomplete based on evidence that surfaced 
subsequent to trial, and (3) a jury made an innocent mistake based 
upon the evidence before it. Said differently, the totality of the 
evidence heard by the jury. . .  can be described three ways: (1) 
corrupted, (2) incomplete, or (3) complete.
The highest degree of confidence can be placed in a jury verdict 
when the jury heard the complete body of relevant evidence. This 
scenario has already given rise [in Jackson v. Virginia] to a federal
under a continuing cloud of suspicion, and erosion of some of our most fundamental 
constitutional principles.” Id. at 1162 (footnote omitted).
189. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313 (1979). Federal courts can review 
insufficiency of the evidence claims from state prisoners to ensure the evidence was 
sufficient for a reasonable jury to convict a criminal defendant as required by the 
Constitution. Id. at 320-21. For courts hearing such claims, “the relevant question 
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 318-20.
190. See, e.g., id. at 324 (“We hold that. . .  the applicant is entitled to habeas 
corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at trial no rational 
trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (emphasis 
added)).
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standard of review on habeas.. . .  “[A]fter viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the prosecution, [a court asks under this 
standard whether] any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”191
In contrast, the “lowest degree of confidence” is afforded to cases 
in which the “jury hear[d] a corrupted body of evidence”: because 
“the procedural protections in place to protect the innocent from 
conviction have been breached, confidence in the result of the trial is 
generally undermined.”192 The standard of review for such cases is 
also already established and requires “a ‘reasonable probability’ of a 
different result,” further defined as evidence that “‘undermines [the 
court’s] confidence in the outcome of the trial.’”193
The standard of review for cases with “incomplete” records, i.e., 
cases in which evidence of innocence is discovered after trial, “falls in 
the middle.”194 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Georgia concluded the standard must therefore be “clear and 
convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted 
[the petitioner] in light of the new evidence.”195 This standard fits 
well within Supreme Court precedent. The Court has only provided 
one concrete definition of innocence, and that is in the procedural 
default context.196 For Schlup procedural “gateway” claims of
191. In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *44 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 
318-19).
192. Id. at *45.
193. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (quoting United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985)) (“A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result 
is accordingly shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the trial.’”); see also In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, 
at *45; Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (To show prejudice from 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a “challenger must demonstrate ‘a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.’” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 694(1984))).
194. In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *45.
195. Id.
196. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-29 (1995). When constitutional 
claims are subject to “a procedural bar” such as timeliness or successive or abusive 
petitions, a federal court can consider those otherwise barred constitutional claims 
on the merits if a petitioner makes a sufficient showing of “actual innocence.” Id.
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innocence, the Supreme Court has defined innocence as requiring a 
showing “that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would 
have convicted him [or her] in the light of the new evidence.” 197 
Thus, even in cases of procedural default, the Supreme Court has not 
tom the burden of proof for establishing innocence from its 
constitutional roots: innocence is still presumed absent sufficient 
evidence of guilt.
With regard to a “hypothetical freestanding innocence claim,” the 
Court has said that its decisions relating to actual innocence imply that 
such freestanding claims require a higher burden of proof than a 
procedural gateway or Schlup innocence claim. 198 In other words, a 
freestanding or Herrera innocence claim requires a showing more 
persuasive than the showing required by Schlup that, “more likely 
than not, in light of the new evidence, no reasonable juror would find 
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—or, to remove the double 
negative, that more likely than not any reasonable juror would have 
reasonable doubt.” 199 “[C]lear and convincing evidence that no 
reasonable juror would have convicted [the petitioner] in the light of 
the new evidence”—the standard rejected by the Supreme Court as too 
high for procedural default innocence claims—would satisfy that 
requirement. 200
197. Id. at 327. Schlup claims are claims of actual innocence sufficiently 
strong to entitle petitioners to have their otherwise procedurally-barred independent 
constitutional claims heard on the merits. Id. The Schlup Court cited to precedent 
in which it had “concluded that a prisoner retains an overriding ‘interest in obtaining 
his release from custody if he is innocent of the charge for which he was 
incarcerated.”’ Id. at 321 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452 (1986)). 
Because the “individual interest in avoiding injustice is most compelling in the 
context of actual innocence,” such interest outweighs society’s “interests in finality, 
comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources.” Id. at 324.
198. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006) (“The sequence of the Court’s 
decisions in Herrera and Schlup—first leaving unresolved the status of freestanding 
claims and then establishing the gateway standard—implies at the least that Herrera 
requires more convincing proof of innocence than Schlup.”).
199. Id. at 538, 555.
200. In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *45. The Schlup Court specifically 
held that for Schlup innocence claims the clear and convincing evidence standard 
was too high and that the preponderance standard was the appropriate standard for 
governing these claims. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-29.
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Moreover, the Supreme Court has explained that the reasonable 
doubt standard “is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of 
convictions resting on factual error.”201 The Supreme Court further 
held that “it is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be 
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether 
innocent men are being condemned.”202 Now that DNA evidence has 
proven that constitutional protections sometimes fail and the innocent 
are wrongfully convicted, these same concerns must inform post­
conviction procedures as well.
To date, at least eight states have tied the standard for proving 
innocence to a showing that no reasonable trier of fact would have 
convicted in light of the new evidence.203 However, many states
201. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
202. Id. at 364.
203. ARK. Code Ann . § 16-112-20 l(a)(l)-(2) (West 2014) (A convicted 
person “may commence a proceeding to secure relief’ if “[sjcientific evidence not 
available at trial establishes .. . actual innocence” or the “scientific predicate for the 
claim could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due 
diligence and the facts underlying the claim .. . would be sufficient to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would find the 
petitioner guilty of the underlying offense.”); Del. Code Ann . tit. 11, § 4504(b) 
(West 2014) (standard for new trial is “clear and convincing evidence that no 
reasonable trier of fact, considering [all of the evidence], would have convicted the 
person”); Fla. R. CRIM. P. 3.853 (allowing motion for post-conviction DNA testing 
if there is a “reasonable probability that the movant would have been acquitted or 
would have received a lesser sentence if the DNA evidence had been admitted at 
trial”); Kan . STAT. Ann . § 21-2512 (2013) (authorizing relief if “results of [post­
conviction] DNA testing” creates a “reasonable probability. . .  that the new 
evidence would result in a different outcome at a trial or sentencing”), deemed 
unconstitutional as applied by State v. Cheeks, 310 P.3d 346, 356 (Kan. 2013), and 
State v. Denney, 101 P.3d 1257, 1269 (Kan. 2004); La . CODE Crim . Proc. Ann . art. 
851 (2014) (authorizing motions for new trial based on “[n]ew and material 
evidence that.. . probably would have changed the verdict or judgment of guilty”), 
amended by Act No. 564, 2014 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 564 (West); N.Y. Crim . 
PROC. Law  § 440.10(g)-(g-l) (McKinney 2014) (authorizing motion to vacate 
judgment based on new evidence which creates a “reasonable probability that the 
verdict would have been more favorable”); 42 Pa . CONS. Stat. § 9543(a), (b) (2014) 
(authorizing motion for post-conviction relief based on new “exculpatory evidence” 
that “would have changed the outcome of the trial”); Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Bankr. 
Estate of Lake Geneva Sugar Shack, Inc., by Waldschmidt, 572 N.W.2d 881, 894 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (courts “‘may grant a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence’” when it is ‘“reasonably probable that a different result would be 
reached’” (quoting State v. Terrance J.W., 550 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Wis. Ct. App.
2014] In n o cen ce  P resu m ed 221
require much more, 204 which only increases the need for the federal 
courts to establish a constitutional floor—a floor that is both 
workable, as detailed in Part IV, and inclusive of all those requiring 
constitutional protections.
1. Pitfalls o f Affirmative Evidence o f Innocence
Requiring affirmative evidence of innocence is extremely 
problematic because even the completely innocent may not be able to 
produce such evidence. Consider, for instance, the plight of someone 
convicted only by eyewitness testimony.205 No physical evidence 
ever connected him to the crime. There is no physical evidence to 
submit for DNA testing and no one has confessed to the crime, but the 
eyewitnesses have recanted their trial testimony, submitting new 
evidence that they did not actually see anything. The eyewitnesses 
explain that the police told them they had caught the perpetrator, and 
so the witnesses identified the man sitting at the defense table. They 
further explain that they did not see the perpetrator well enough to 
identify him. Everyone finds their new statements credible, including 
the judge and the district attorney. Clearly, there is no longer any 
reliable evidence of guilt, but neither is there any affirmative evidence 
of innocence. Can we, or should we, continue to incarcerate such a 
person?
1996))); Swafford v. State, 125 So.3d 760, 778 (Fla. 2013) (granting a new trial 
based on DNA evidence because it would ‘“probably produce on acquittal on 
retrial”’ (quoting Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512, 523 (Fla. 1998))); Kubsch v. State, 
934 N.E.2d 1138, 1145 (Ind. 2010) (‘“ [N]ew evidence will mandate a new trial only 
when. . .  it will probably produce a different result at retrial’” (first alteration in 
original) (quoting Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 329-30 (Ind. 2006))).
204. See sources cited supra note 140.
205. See, e.g., Jack Leonard, Murder Conviction Voided After 20 Years, L.A. 
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/16/local/la-me-murder- 
conviction-overtumed-20110316. In 1992, Francisco Carrillo, Jr., was convicted of 
murder “solely on the word of six teenage” eyewitnesses. Id. After the witnesses 
later recanted, a reenactment of the crime corroborated the witnesses’ admissions 
that they were unable to see the shooter’s face. Id. After Carrillo’s conviction was 
overturned, a prosecutor with the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office 
agreed with Judge Paul A. Bacigalupo that the charges against Carrillo should be 
dismissed. Jack Leonard, Judge Dismisses Murder Charges Against Man Who 
Spent More than 20 Years in Prison, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.eom/2011/apr/05/local/la-me-charges-dismissed-20110405.
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In Carriger v. Stewart, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the 
‘“extraordinarily high’” showing discussed in Herrera contemplates 
“at least” that “a habeas petitioner asserting a freestanding innocence 
claim must go beyond demonstrating doubt about his guilt, and must 
affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent.”206 The Ninth 
Circuit’s subsequent analysis of the evidence of innocence proffered 
by Carriger demonstrates the problem with requiring affirmative 
evidence of innocence as opposed to presuming innocence absent 
evidence of guilt. In denying Carriger’s innocence claim, the Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that,
[although the postconviction evidence he presents casts a vast 
shadow of doubt over the reliability of his conviction, nearly all of 
it serves only to undercut the evidence presented at trial, not 
affirmatively to prove Carriger’s innocence. Carriger has presented 
no evidence, for example, demonstrating he was elsewhere at the 
time of the murder, nor is there any new and reliable physical 
evidence, such as DNA, that would preclude any possibility of 
Carriger’s guilt.207
Similarly, California has established a standard that is nearly 
impossible to meet absent conclusive DNA evidence: a petitioner 
“must undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to 
innocence” with evidence no “reasonable jury could. . .  reject[].”208 
As one California Supreme Court Justice explained in criticizing this 
standard,
The requirement of the majority that the petitioner prove his 
innocence, either by establishing an alibi or by identifying the 
perpetrator of the crime, is unreasonable and unwarranted. A 
perfectly innocent person may be unable to prove an alibi. And it is 
preposterous to demand of the accused that he place his finger upon 
the real culprit in order to exculpate himself. Although Billings has
206. Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Herrera v. 
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993)) (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 442-46 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting)).
207. Id. ax All.
208. In re Lawley, 179 P.3d 891, 898-99 (Cal. 2008) (citations omitted) 
(quoting In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 739, 761 n.33 (1993) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).
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presented an alibi, it is unnecessary for us to consider it. When the 
chain of proof is destroyed, he needs none. 209
Thus, given the real danger that affirmative evidence of innocence 
may be lacking, the courts should not ask for anything further to prove 
innocence when new evidence destroys the evidence of guilt; instead, 
courts must presume innocence in the absence of adequate proof of 
guilt.
2. Pitfalls o f Requiring DNA Evidence
Numerous states currently require DNA or other scientific 
evidence to prove innocence.210 However, physical evidence that 
could be subject to DNA testing may only exist in a small number of 
criminal cases.211 Even when such evidence does exist, it may have 
been lost or destroyed long before it could be subjected to DNA 
testing. Moreover, the disparity between DNA and non-DNA 
exonerations demonstrate that restricting post-conviction relief to 
DNA fails to provide a useful mechanism of relief for the majority of 
innocent people in prison. While at least 316 people have been 
exonerated by DNA evidence, nearly a thousand have been exonerated 
without DNA evidence.212 Indeed, the number of DNA exonerations 
has been steadily shrinking in the last few years, while the number of 
non-DNA exonerations has grown quickly, reaching a record high of 
72 non-DNA exonerations across the United States in 2013.213 Thus, 
limiting innocence claims to DNA evidence ignores the lessons we 
have learned from the DNA exonerations that apply to the criminal 
justice system at large and also knowingly employs a system that fails 
to identify and release the majority of the innocent people who are in 
prison for crimes they did not commit.
States should not restrict innocence claims to those based upon 
DNA or affirmative evidence of innocence, but to the extent that they
209. In re Billings, 298 P. 1071, 1119 (Cal. 1930) (Langdon, J., dissenting).
210. See supra note 140.
211. Department o f Justice Oversight, supra note 9.
212. See sources cited supra note 135.
213. Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, NAT’L Reg’Y OF 
Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration- 
by-Year.aspx (last visited June 24, 2014).
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do, the need for federal courts to establish a constitutional standard is 
only increased.
B. Finding Innocence: Relief and Retrial
When a state or federal court grants habeas relief to a prisoner, the 
prosecutor generally will be granted time to appeal or to retry or 
dismiss the case.214 It is only when a state or federal court grants a 
habeas petition based on insufficiency of the evidence that the 
prosecutor cannot retry the petitioner because that finding has the 
force of an acquittal and thus implicates the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.215 In every other situation, however, retrial is permitted.216
Innocence claims raise interesting questions regarding whether 
retrial should be permitted. Should a federal court’s finding of 
innocence, or a finding that no reasonable juror could convict, 
collaterally estop a state retrial because the ultimate issue—guilt or 
innocence—has been fully litigated by the parties and decided by a 
court? One scholar recently developed an interesting argument that 
the Double Jeopardy Clause should bar retrial in such cases.217 While
214. See, e.g., Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987) (“[Federal 
courts may delay the release of a successful habeas petitioner in order to provide the 
State an opportunity to correct the constitutional violation found by the court.”); 
People v. Black, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 113, 117 (Ct. App. 2004) (“The district court’s 
selection of the 60-day time frame was pursuant to its powers to dispose of 
defendant’s habeas petition in a lawful and just manner.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2243)).
215. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 & 16 n.10 (1978) (“The Double 
Jeopardy Clause [of the Fifth Amendment] forbids a second trial for the purpose of 
affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to 
muster in the first proceeding.. . .  In holding the evidence insufficient to sustain 
guilt, an appellate court determines that the prosecution has failed to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
216. Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 402 (1987) (“It is a ‘venerable principle] 
of double jeopardy jurisprudence’ that ‘[t]he successful appeal of a judgment of 
conviction, on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the 
verdict, poses no bar to further prosecution on the same charge.’” (alterations in 
original) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90-91 
(1978))); see also Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 37-39 (1988) (explaining that 
reversals via habeas corpus or other collateral attack, along with reversals via 
appeals, permit retrials in all situations other than reversals based upon the 
insufficiency of the evidence).
217. Jordan M. Barry, Prosecuting the Exonerated: Actual Innocence and the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, 64 STAN. L. Rev . 535, 554-57, 562-65, 580-87 (2012).
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there are of course federalism concerns when a federal court bars a 
state from retrying and punishing someone for a state crime, such a 
system is already employed for successful insufficiency of the 
evidence claims. 218
When a state court makes the finding of innocence—or federalism 
concerns are not an issue—the burden of proof may be the deciding 
factor in whether retrial is permitted. For instance, the District of 
Columbia has tied relief to the following burdens of proof: the court 
shall grant a new trial when the inmate proves that it is “more likely 
than not” that he is innocent, but when the inmate proves that he is 
innocent by “clear and convincing evidence,” the court “shall vacate 
the conviction and dismiss the relevant count with prejudice” (thus 
barring retrial) . 219
The reach of the Eighth Amendment raises yet another question 
for federal courts. If a federal court finds that a petitioner is entitled to 
relief under the Eighth Amendment, which speaks only to punishment, 
can the court reverse the conviction or solely vacate the sentence? It 
is conceivable that if a court found that continued punishment of an 
innocent inmate constituted cruel and unusual punishment, the court 
could vacate the sentence, but would have to leave the conviction in 
place.
Although this outcome may seem unfair, or even absurd, vacation 
of the sentence at least restores liberty. Further, if the conviction is 
left in place, there is no possibility of retrial, a perhaps unexpected 
benefit of this approach.220 However, even though a court had 
recognized the individual’s innocence, the conviction would 
paradoxically remain legally valid, and all collateral consequences, 
such as limitations on employment and voting, would remain in 
place. 221
218. See id. at 580-84; see also Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 38-40.
219. D.C. CODE § 22-4135(g)(2)-(3) (2009).
220. While in many exonerations the charges are subsequently dropped, that 
process often takes additional months of incarceration and may involve torturous 
time-served plea offers. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 217, at 536-40. Further, some 
exonerees do go through retrials, such as John Thompson, who was eventually 
acquitted after “only 35 minutes” of deliberation. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 
1350, 1375-76 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
221. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 217, at 541 n.44, 561 (discussing collateral 
consequences of felony convictions).
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There is merit in the idea that a federal finding of actual innocence 
should bar state retrial, but also merit in respect for the principles of 
federalism and comity. This article does not propose a resolution to 
the question of whether a federal finding of innocence should bar 
retrial, but rather suggests that state and federal courts and legislatures 
must grapple with these questions as they continue to develop their 
approach to innocence claims.
VI. The P a th  F o r w a r d : A  W o rkable  
M odel  fo r  Ju dicia l  Re v iew
Any post-conviction claim raises the specter of concerns 
regarding judicial economy, floodgates, and finality. However, the 
enactments of DNA testing statutes and the removal of conviction- 
related time bars from innocence claims demonstrate the modem 
consensus that the individual rights retained by the innocent overcome 
these concerns.222 Similarly, the Supreme Court has explained in the 
procedural default context that the individual liberty interests retained 
by the innocent overcome society’s interests in “finality, comity, and 
conservation of scarce judicial resources.”223
For these reasons, “the principles of comity and finality. . .  must 
yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust 
incarceration.”224 Moreover, the system already in place for 
reviewing habeas petitions filed by state prisoners is one within which 
freestanding claims of innocence fit neatly and thus will not be a 
substantial drain on judicial resources.
Existing procedures demonstrate that federal courts are well 
equipped and able to review such freestanding innocence claims when 
there is no mechanism available for relief in state courts. As with 
other habeas claims, federal courts need only entertain claims that 
demonstrate prima facie evidence requiring relief.225 In other words, a
222. See discussion supra Part II.
223. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-26 (1995).
224. Id. at 320-21 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Murray v. 
Carrier, A ll U.S. 478, 495 (1986)).
225. See, e.g., Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“[CJourts considering the appropriateness of an evidentiary hearing should 
determine whether the [habeas] petition presents a prima facie showing which, if
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petitioner raising a freestanding actual innocence claim would need to 
present evidence that, if true, establishes clearly and convincingly that 
no reasonable juror would convict.226 The federal courts already 
review procedural gateway innocence claims and have asserted that 
the preponderance of evidence must show no reasonable juror would 
convict. 227 The courts have proven themselves able to consider and 
resolve such claims and have not been overwhelmed or flooded by 
them. There is no rational reason to believe the courts could not also 
review innocence claims that meet an even more restrictive burden of 
proof.
Further, many of these claims will be resolved in state courts. As 
with other constitutional claims, the federal courts will simply ensure 
that state courts do not miss meritorious claims. There is a workable 
model for judicial review of freestanding innocence claims. The 
following proposed federal legislation merely would remove current 
statutory impediments to such much-needed review.
A. Federal Legislation: Removing Unconstitutional Restrictions
As discussed in Part I, AEDPA currently precludes federal courts 
from reviewing compelling claims of innocence. 228 However, 
AEDPA’s preclusive effect on such claims was likely unintended and, 
as shown below, is easily fixed. Further, two Circuit Courts and three 
Supreme Court Justices have suggested that AEDPA is 
unconstitutional to the extent that it bars review of compelling claims 
of innocence.229
For example, the Second Circuit observed that “serious Eighth 
Amendment and due process questions would arise with respect to the 
AEDPA” if it precluded federal review of innocence claims.230 In 
another case, the Second Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit that
proven, would enable the petitioner to prevail on the merits of the asserted claim.” 
(italics in original) (interpreting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465,474 (2007))).
226. See discussion supra Part III.
227. E.g., Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326-27; House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 
(2006) (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327); McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 
1935 (2013) (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327).
228. See supra Part I.
229. See cases cited infra notes 230-32.
230. Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 378-79 (2d Cir. 1997).
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“[w]ere no other avenue of judicial review available for a party who 
claims that s/he is factually or legally innocent. . .  we would be faced 
with a thorny constitutional issue.”231 In his In re Davis concurrence, 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, noted that 
AEDPA “is arguably unconstitutional to the extent it bars relief for a 
death row inmate who has established his innocence.”232
Congress should address these constitutional concerns and amend 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).233 Specifically, Congress should explicitly 
exempt freestanding claims of innocence from the provision that 
prohibits federal courts from granting habeas relief unless the state 
court’s denial was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court.”234
The following excerpt from § 2254(d) includes proposed 
amendments to the statute in italics:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 
granted with respect to any claim, other than a freestanding claim 
o f actual innocence, that was adjudicated on the merits in State 
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 
State court proceeding.235
If adopted, the proposed revision would do much to remove any 
question that AEDPA is not intended to preclude federal review of 
freestanding actual innocence claims.
231. Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514, 552 (2d Cir. 2012) (alteration and ellipsis 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 
245,248 (3d Cir. 1997)).
232. In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 952 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring).
233. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
234. Id. § 2254(d)(1).
235. Id. § 2254(d).
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B. Reinforcing Constitutional Protections with State Legislation
This article largely focused on innocence as a freestanding federal 
constitutional claim and the need for federal review of such claims. 
However, the need for federal review would decrease if states further 
revised their respective approaches to post-conviction claims of 
innocence.
The model state legislation proposed below does the following: 
(1) defines proving innocence as a showing that no reasonable juror 
could convict and ties relief to the burden of proof; (2) explicitly 
provides for all kinds of newly discovered evidence as potential bases 
for innocence claims; (3) ensures innocence claims are not restricted 
by procedural bars; and (4) details a workable procedure for review 
and litigation of innocence claims.
§ xxx. Post-Conviction Innocence Claims
Claim: After a defendant is convicted and sentenced for a crime, 
and after the time period for a defendant to file a motion for new trial 
or reconsideration has passed, a defendant may file a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus alleging that he or she is innocent of the offense for 
which he or she was convicted and sentenced. Such a claim need not 
additionally allege an independent constitutional violation, and it need 
not address, refer to, or rely upon statutory remedies or procedures 
outside of those addressed in this section.
Basis: A claim presented under this section must be supported by 
evidence, which shows that, based on the new evidence and the entire 
record before the jury, no rational juror would have found the 
defendant guilty. Such evidence includes but is not limited to: DNA 
results; new scientific evidence; a change in science undermining the 
validity of that presented at trial; a demonstration that the evidence of 
guilt presented at trial was false or biased or otherwise unreliable; 
recantations by material witnesses; third-party confessions; new alibi 
evidence; or any new material information from a witness to the 
crime.
Procedure: Upon presentation of such a claim, the court must 
determine whether the inmate has alleged a prima facie basis for 
relief. In other words, assuming the new evidence is true, the court 
must decide whether the evidence establishes that no reasonable juror 
would convict.
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When a petition does not allege a prima facie basis for relief, the 
court must deny the petition.
When a petition presents a prima facie basis for relief, the court 
must issue an order to show cause directing the respondent to respond 
within sixty days by (1) conceding the inmate is entitled to relief; (2) 
requesting an evidentiary hearing to test the validity of the evidence; 
or (3) presenting evidence demonstrating the court should deny relief. 
Thirty days after the respondent files a return to the order to show 
cause, the petitioner must file a traverse conceding or disputing the 
facts alleged in the return. The court may deem as admitted any facts 
not specifically disputed in the return or traverse.
The court may grant or deny petitions based on the admitted facts.
If relief is dependent on credibility questions or disputed facts, the 
court shall order an evidentiary hearing at which the petitioner must 
prove the facts he or she has alleged are true.
The court may grant extensions of time upon request and a 
showing of good cause.
Burden and Relief: The petitioner bears the burden of showing 
that no reasonable juror would convict. A petitioner can make this 
showing by one of the following burdens of proof, each of which 
results in the relief described therein:
If the court finds that the petitioner has proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that no reasonable jury would convict, 
the court shall reverse the conviction. The prosecution shall proceed 
with retrial or dismiss the case within sixty days of the reversal.
If the court finds that the petitioner has proven by clear and 
convincing evidence that no reasonable jury would convict, the court 
shall reverse the conviction and order the petitioner released on his or 
her own recognizance. The prosecution shall retry or dismiss the 
charges within sixty days of the reversal.
If the court finds that the petitioner has proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that no reasonable jury would convict, the court shall 
reverse the conviction and dismiss the count(s) with prejudice.
Procedural Bars: No procedural bars, whether statutorily or 
judicially created, apply to claims raised under this section.
Review: A court’s denial or grant of a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus is reviewed de novo. Factual findings and credibility 
determinations made following an evidentiary hearing are entitled to 
great deference and are reviewed for plain error.
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Conclusion
Despite widespread confusion in the legal literature, the Supreme 
Court has not resolved whether innocence is a freestanding federal 
constitutional claim. Relevant circumstances have changed since the 
Court analyzed this issue in Herrera. Modem consensus and widely 
shared practice now demonstrate that innocence claims are entitled to 
the constitutional protections of the Eighth and the Fourteenth 
Amendments.
States have recognized the need to alter their approach to 
innocence claims in the wake of DNA evidence and scientific proof 
that innocent people are sometimes wrongfully convicted. Federal 
courts and Congress, however, have not yet done so. Yet the 
idiosyncrasies in state laws, from unduly high burdens to restrictive 
bases for proving innocence, along with the very definition of due 
process, demonstrate the need for federal courts to provide a 
constitutional safety net to identify and release the innocent prisoners 
who fall through the cracks of state and federal laws.
This article has developed, in more detail and upon different bases 
than any prior effort, a new constitutional analysis demonstrating that 
innocence is a freestanding federal constitutional claim. It also details 
a workable system of federal judicial review of compelling claims of 
innocence that fits neatly within existing federal practices and 
procedures. The proposed burden of proof for establishing a 
freestanding constitutional claim of innocence properly balances the 
individual liberty interests retained by the innocent with society’s 
interests in finality. This proposed burden further serves the goal of 
judicial economy and is informed by the principles upon which our 
system of criminal justice is built: when there is no longer any proof 
of guilt, innocence must be presumed. The simplicity of the 
recommended approach would open no litigation floodgates. Instead, 
it would close an existing gap in constitutional protection for the very 
people our criminal justice system is designed to protect: the innocent.
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